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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

SC Regulation 525-13

01 Mar 2002

Effective Upon Receipt

Organization and Functions

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT REGULATION

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1. Purpose. Provide guidance to assure continuity of essential missions and functions in the event of a WMD incident in the immediate Miami SC facilities area. This regulation provides for the protection of the headquarters and assigned personnel, possible relocation of essential command personnel to an alternate command post (ACP), and recovery operations.

Directorates should amplify instructions contained herein to ensure their required actions are completed in a timely manner.

2. References.

- a. SC Reg 525-22, USSOUTHCOM Reporting Procedures, HQ USSOUTHCOM, 9 Mar 98.
- b. SC Reg 10-18, USSOUTHCOM Hurricane Regulation, HQ USSOUTHCOM, 25 May 2000.
- c. AR 525-13, Antiterrorism Force Protection (AT/FP): Security of Personnel, Information, and Critical Resources, HQ DA, 10 Sep 98.
- d. Medical Management of Chemical Casualties Handbook, Second Edition, Chemical Casualty Care Office, Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Sep 1995.
- e. Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, Second Edition, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, August 1996.
- f. FM 8-10-7, Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment, HQ DA, 22 Apr 93.
- g. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, HQ DA, 29 Dec 1994.
- h. USAG-M AT/FP Plan, Feb 2001.

3. Abbreviations and Definitions. See Appendix F for Definitions and Appendix G for Abbreviations.

4. Applicability. This regulation applies to Headquarters, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and USSOUTHCOM controlled off-site facilities in Miami, and other agencies/host bases as required.

5. Conditions for Implementation.

- a. This regulation is applicable upon receipt.
- b. The WMD plan for this headquarters will be implemented when the CoS, or the J3/J32 or Watch Captain, Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC), (in the order listed here) issues the order to implement this plan. The USAG-M Commander, or designated representative, is designated as the default on-scene commander. The designated USAG-M On-Scene Commander will follow USAG-M Emergency Response Procedures and the WMD Annex to the USAG-M AT/FP Plan.
- c. In the event the JOIC is unable to issue the order, this plan will be implemented upon order from the Senior Officer in the Chain of Command. The USAG-M Commander, or

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designated representative, is designated as the default on-scene commander.

6. Concept of Operations.

This regulation aims to define coherent procedures for event handling, event analysis, and the command decision-making process. Procedures are outlined in the regulation and spelled out in more detail in the Appendix A checklists. The consequence management process begins with designating an initial response and on-scene commander. The regulation contains checklists for leaders, individuals, directorates, and first responders for continued operations, liaison with outside agencies, JOIC reporting, public information, medical response, installation security, directorate and individual response, and security of classified information.

a. Upon direction of the USSOUTHCOM CoS, USSOUTHCOM implements preplanned actions to minimize facility damage and prevent injury to command members. During emergencies, it is usually desirable to evacuate working facilities and activate the Alternate Command Post (ACP) or Emergency Command Post (ECP), as appropriate under the circumstances. However, during a WMD incident which occurs outside the building, often the best course of action is the opposite; i.e. shelter in place. After ensuring the safety of SOUTHCOM personnel, the goal in managing the consequences of a WMD incident remains to ensure continuity of operations essential for the command and control of on-going operations throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

b. Based on information from first responders, emergency personnel, force protection officers, and the JOIC, the Chief of Staff (COS) will direct appropriate actions, which may include:

(1) For personnel not on duty, direct them not to report to USSOUTHCOM facilities and to call the 'Command Information Hotline' for further instructions. For personnel on duty in USSOUTHCOM facilities, direct them to complete directorate WMD incident consequence management procedures and to shelter in place or evacuate the facility, as appropriate.

(2) Directing the U.S. Army Garrison Miami (USAG-M) Commander (or designated representative), who serves as the on scene Commander, to initiate actions to care for casualties and protect personnel, the headquarters building, and other USSOUTHCOM facilities and property in the local area.

(3) If possible and deemed safe by proper medical authority, releasing non-essential personnel from duty to secure personal property and move dependents as required.

(4) Notifying the National Military Command Center (NMCC), country teams, and components of intentions to relocate critical C2 functions and associated staff (Command Group Alpha), if required.

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(a) Standing up the Disaster Response Cell (RC) and the WMD Consequence Management Group (WMDCMG) in the Crisis Action Center (CAC), or other designated location (in the event the HQ is contaminated/attacked), to implement the WMD incident plan outlined in this regulation. The WMDCMG will prepare the headquarters to manage the consequences of a WMD incident and the RC will coordinate preparations for a shift of C2 functions to the ACP while the JOIC maintains command continuity throughout the AOR. The composition of the RC and WMDCMG is provided in Appendix A, Checklist C.

(5) Directing the Security Division to implement procedures to protect classified government information as outlined in Appendix C.

c. The WMD incident Plan checklists are promulgated in Appendix A and summarized in Paragraph 10.

7. Command Relationships.

a. Emergency Operations.

(1) Disaster Response Cell (RC) and WMD Consequence Management Group (WMDCMG).

(a) Upon direction from the USSOUTHCOM CoS, USSOUTHCOM will activate a RC and WMDCMG in the Crisis Action Center (CAC), or other designated uncontaminated location. The composition of the RC and WMDCMG is provided in Appendix A, Checklist C.

(b) The RC and the WMDCMG will coordinate, track, and anticipate requirements outlined in the WMD incident plan and preparation checklists to ensure that the headquarters is actively managing the consequences of a WMD incident and that the activities of USSOUTHCOM are consistent with national, state, and local civil activities.

(c) Once the WMD incident passes, the RC and WMDCMG will coordinate damage and casualty assessment reports and reconstitution tasks at Headquarters and other USSOUTHCOM facilities in Miami.

(2) JOIC.

(a) The JOIC remains responsible for maintaining situational awareness throughout the AOR during the period the RC and WMDCMG execute the WMD incident consequence management plan. The JOIC's primary mission is to maintain communications with the National Command Authority and component commands while ensuring that subordinates, components and country teams are informed of the status of HQ USSOUTHCOM. The JOIC and the ACP, when activated, will report USCINCSO status to NMCC and other organizations per established JOIC procedures.

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(b) In the event that conditions deteriorate to the point that communications cannot be maintained, the ACP will assume all priority JOIC functions.

(3) Alternate Command Post (ACP).

(a) If required, the ACP will establish operations at USSOUTHAF Headquarters Davis-Monthan, AFB, AZ. The ACP is intended for use when the ECP is unavailable and/or the requirement is for a long period of time.

(b) If required, the ECP will establish operations at the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center (MDEOC). The ECP is intended for use for short term requirements.

(c) The ACP will be manned by sufficient USSOUTHCOM personnel to sustain the JOIC watch and provide a limited but functional battle staff capability. Manning for this team is provided in Annex 1 to Appendix B.

(d) The ACP's primary responsibility is to maintain C2 throughout the AOR. If there is an on-going CAT at the time of headquarters evacuation, additional staff will be required to deploy to the ACP. The Officer-in-Charge of the ACP will normally be the J32 or the VJ3.

8. Situation:

a. **General.** The WMD threat to USG & DOD facilities, personnel, and operations is real. USSOUTHCOM must protect its personnel, facilities, and resources to the maximum extent possible to mitigate the effects of WMD incidents, and quickly restore primary mission functions following such an occurrence. USCINCSO's command responsibilities require continuity of operations throughout the AOR.

b. **Key Assumptions.** Initiative will be key to the success of the WMD consequence management plan:

(1) This is a living document and must be updated at least annually in conjunction with the USSOUTHCOM Hurricane Regulation SC Reg 10-18, USSOUTHCOM ACP and ECP plans, the WMD Annex to the USAG-M AT/FP Plan, and USSOUTHCOM Emergency Management Procedures.

(2) There will be little or no warning of a WMD incident in the South Florida/Miami area.

(3) Local emergency personnel are designated to assist the Miami facilities in the event of a WMD incident. However, if the incident affects a large area or multiple locations in the Miami area, local emergency assistance may be slow in coming.

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(4) USAG-M security forces and response personnel are intended to be the first responders to USSOUTHCOM facilities in Miami during a WMD incident.

(5) USAG-M security forces and response personnel could become casualties in a WMD attack.

(6) The headquarters building is designed with some over-pressurization, but the building is not air tight and has not been specifically designed or retrofitted to prevent a chemical or biological agent from entering the building.

| (7) We currently possess no chemical or biological agent detection capability.

| (8) We currently possess no nuclear, chemical, or biological decontamination capability. We are currently evaluating the potential for facility, equipment, and personnel decontamination resources and procedures.

(9) If the USSOUTHCOM Headquarters requires evacuation, it is a goal to maintain continuous communications between the JOIC, NMCC, components, and other subordinate commands until the ACP is stood up.

(10) If required, Headquarters, USSOUTHAF and its host AF Wing, the 355th Wing, will provide administrative support, communications resources, lodging for personnel, and messing facilities to support the ACP at Davis Monthan AFB, AZ.

(11) If commercial electrical power is lost at the headquarters in Miami, the emergency generators for the headquarters may be required to operate longer than 120 hours (5 days).

(12) Miami area cellular telephone and pager communications circuits could become overwhelmed.

(13) Miami area commercial/residential telephone communications could become overwhelmed and/or unavailable.

(14) Road movement could stop or become congested to the point of non-feasible for safe passage. Alternate means of safe travel to the nearest airport must be considered.

c. Constraints and limitations.

(1) The USSOUTHCOM ACP at Davis Monthan AFB will depend upon USSOUTHAF for support. For this reason, ACP at Davis Monthan AFB must be an austere operation capable of 24 hour operations for a limited period (see appendix B).

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(2) Individual commercial airlines may suspend operations to/from Miami area subsequent to a WMD incident.

(3) Military transport aircraft may not be available for air movement of the ACP main body and/or Command Group Alpha to Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ.

(4) Lack of NBC/WMD reconnaissance, decontamination, monitoring, and remediation capability (trained personnel/units and equipment).

(5) HQ USSOUTHCOM is totally dependent on local civilian fire, emergency rescue service, and HAZMAT capabilities. The HQ is also heavily dependent on local law enforcement for enhanced security and law enforcement investigative support.

9. Execution.**a. Concept of Operations.**

(1) Command and control operations in the JOIC will be maintained until the ACP is operational or it is necessary to evacuate personnel for safety reasons. The ACP will establish all required communication links in the most expeditious manner possible to allow uninterrupted command and control capability.

(2) Once the command and control hand-off is complete, if appropriate medical personnel deem it safe to do so, designated individuals from the RC and WMDCMG will remain in the headquarters building as a response team under the control of the DPO (USAG-M). This team will serve as the nucleus for reconstitution operations once the incident passes. Assisting in the reactivation of the Headquarters Building (or another permanent facility so designated), the RC and WMDCMG will resume operations in the CAC, while JOIC systems are returned to normal operational capacity.

(3) In addition to re-establishing operational capability of the headquarters, the RC will, as a priority, establish a complete and detailed accountability for all assigned personnel. It is an individual service member and civilian employee responsibility to call the point of contact established by each directorate with a brief report of his or her whereabouts and status. Directorates will provide status reports to the RC J1 representative at (305) 437-3903/3523/3525.

b. Alerting Procedures. The JOIC is the primary gathering and reporting place for information to the Command Group and senior staff. When directed by USCINCSO, the JOIC sets the Emergency Condition (EMERGCON) for the headquarters, as prescribed in the time phase checklists in Appendix A. The RC, WMDCMG, and JOIC carry out actions in Appendix A and keep the J3 informed.

c. Order to Implement. The order to implement this plan will be issued by the

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USSOUTHCOM CoS. In the event the CoS is unavailable or incapacitated, the J3, J32, or JOIC Chief (in this order), will issue the order to implement this plan. The time-phase checklists discussed below and promulgated in Appendix A will be followed, as much as is possible, in the event this plan is implemented.

d. **Tasks.**

(1) Each directorate and special staff office will:

(a) Designate a field-grade officer Disaster Preparedness Representative (DPR) to coordinate equipment storage plans, personnel accountability and recall/stay put plans. The Directorate's DPR is the point of contact for all activities of the WMD Consequence Management Group. The DPR works with the Security Managers and executive officers to ensure that tasks to be performed and mandated by this regulation are rehearsed and resourced.

(b) Identify and maintain the appropriate number of security managers to execute Classified/Sensitive item storage plans in accordance with Appendix C. Ensure directorate security managers have a protection plan for removal, transport, and storage of classified materials in all USSOUTHCOM Miami-area facilities.

(c) Update the roster of assigned personnel and official military dependents living in the South Florida/Miami area in the STEMS database as new personnel are assigned and validate the entries quarterly. Complete and accurate entries are critical to ensure one hundred percent accountability of personnel following a WMD incident. **Upon declaration of EMERGCN DEFENSE EMERGENCY (Checklist C in Appendix A), each directorate will submit a current list of all personnel on leave and TDY to the RC J1 representative in the CAC (X3903).**

(d) Provide complete accountability for all personnel to the J1 RC representative in the CAC at (305) 437-3903/3523/3525 within 6 hours after the JOIC discontinues WMD incident consequence management, assuming commercial telephone systems are operational. Thereafter, each directorate will make follow-up reports to the RC every six hours on the status of injured and un-located personnel until all personnel have received competent medical care and are completely accounted for. Ensure all directorate personnel are instructed to provide a personnel status report to a designated directorate point of contact within 6 hours after notification of discontinuation of WMD incident consequence management.

(e) Working with the DPO, develop and periodically review supporting appendices, annexes, and instructions that support this regulation.

(f) Ensure directorate key personnel, as defined by the directors, are assigned pagers.

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(2) USAG-M Commander (DPO):

(a) The USSOUTHCOM USAG-M Commander is designated the USSOUTHCOM Disaster Preparedness Officer (DPO). The DPO is the primary point of contact with federal, state, and local civil authorities and the focal point for headquarters WMD incident preparedness and recovery operations. The DPO will conduct continuous liaison with appropriate civil authorities to coordinate disaster planning. The Senior DOD Police Officer, as the representative of the USAG-M, will serve as the incident/on scene Commander if practicable. The lead federal agency during a WMD event is normally the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

(b) In conjunction with its required annual review of its Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Plan, review this regulation and coordinate recommended updates as necessary. |

(c) Schedule and conduct WMD incident awareness training for the entire command annually. Prepare/distribute appropriate informational pamphlets for use by members and their families. (Ensure new members receive this information during new-comers orientation brief.)

(d) The DPO, in coordination with directorate WMD incident representatives (DPR's), will develop USAG-M WMD incident response checklists which provide detailed preparation procedures for all USSOUTHCOM Miami area facilities.

(e) Develop internal plans to execute all facility preparation tasks. Procure enough materials to secure and protect all USSOUTHCOM facilities.

(f) Lead the WMD Consequence Management Group (WMDCMG), composed of directorate disaster preparedness representatives, in the execution of command and directorate WMD incident preparations. When called upon by the CoS, initiate previously approved contracts for preparation of the headquarters and other USSOUTHCOM facilities (i.e., warehouses, and offices outside the Thurman Headquarters Building) for a return to normal operations once the incident has passed, and the threat has been fully eradicated IAW designated hazard procedures, protocols and verifications.

(g) Supervise and monitor headquarters preparation and recovery operations, in coordination with the RC.

(h) Maintain appropriate security for the headquarters at all times.

(i) Plan, coordinate, and execute logistics support as required. This includes procurement and storage of a 15-day, 25-person level of supply of MRE's and fresh water for RC, WMDCMG, and security personnel. Storage, dissemination, and consumption should be accomplished so as to avoid contamination. Additionally, an adequate number of cots should be available to support the limited number of people from the JOIC, RC, and

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WMDCMG who may be required to remain in the Headquarters for an indefinite period.

(3) SCJ1 will:

(a) Augment RC with one officer to assist in monitoring personnel issues that arise during checklist execution and to develop personnel status reports for the command group.

(b) J1 RC representative in the CAC will receive personnel status reports from directorates. Within 6 hours after the JOIC discontinues WMD incident warnings, provide a complete personnel accountability list to DPO, RC, and Command Group as required.

(c) Issue travel orders for the ACP Advance Team, ACP Main Body, and Command Group Alpha, as necessary.

(4) SCJ2 will:

(a) Supervise actions outlined in Appendix C (Handling and Destruction of Classified Material).

(b) Monitor intelligence information sources and timely report intelligence information via the JOIC/CAC.

(5) SCJ3 will:

(a) Convene the Disaster Response Representative and WMD Consequence Management Group in February of each year to review and update this regulation, in conjunction with the annual review of the USSOUTHCOM Hurricane Regulation.

(b) Maintain ACP capability to support operations on short notice. Coordinate with SCJ6 to verify all ACP systems are operational and ensure adequate consumable office supplies are prepositioned in the ACP. Conduct a command WMD displacement rehearsal annually (should be conducted in conjunction with Hurricane displacement rehearsal). Appendix B provides more information about the ACP.

(c) Ensure the command's Communications Material Security (CMS) account is adequate to support activation of the ACP while the JOIC continues operations.

(d) Activate a Response Cell (RC) when this WMD incident plan is implemented. Monitor and report the status of task execution required by this regulation. Progress reports will be made at 0700 and 1700 daily. More frequent reports will be made upon JOIC declaration of a WMD incident in the local area.

(e) Provide continuous weather advisories to the CINC, DCINC, CoS, DPO, directorates, and special staff.

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(f) Coordinate preparation and execution of the deployment for the ACP Advanced Party, Main Body, and Command Group.

(g) Coordinate Operational Support Airlift (OSA) support (J33 Air Ops) with TRANSCOM for transportation of the ACP main body and Command Group Alpha, as necessary. (Composition of Command Group Alpha is in Annex 1 to Appendix B.) Commercial carriers will be used if military air travel cannot be arranged.

(h) Operate the ACP in accordance with this regulation and CINCSO guidance.

(i) Maintain full JOIC operations until C2 is transferred to the ACP.

(j) Make headquarters evacuation order recommendations to the Command Group based on WMD USAG-M incident evaluations coordinated with local consequence management authorities.

(k) Coordinate military support for headquarters reconstitution and disaster relief.

(6) SCJ4 will operate the LRC/JMC in the Thurman Headquarters Building, or other designated location, in support of the DPO/RC.

(7) SCJ6 will:

(a) Provide continuous communications support to the CINC, USSOUTHCOM ACP, and USSOUTHCOM Headquarters.

(b) In conjunction with SCJ4, conduct initial coordination for the deployment of the 93rd Signal Brigade (or assigned unit) to assist with recovery operations and provide support in accordance with Appendix E.

(c) Ensure ACP Automated Information Systems (AIS) and communications equipment is maintained in operating condition and updated to remain consistent with the USSOUTHCOM headquarters baseline configuration.

(8) ASA will back-up critical and non-critical computer files on a daily basis per normal SOP for as long as practicable. Store the most recent backup in a location secure and safe from exposure and access by unauthorized personnel. This copy will serve as some insurance against catastrophic damage to the headquarters building and would be used to assist in the recovery of computer systems at the headquarters.

(9) SCPAO will provide and coordinate Public Affairs guidance for disaster operations, ACP relocation, and other related topics of interest and act in accordance with Appendix I to this WMD CM Regulation.

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(10) Secretary of the Joint Staff (SJS) is the DPR for the Command Group and is responsible for all related coordination with the DPO/RC regarding deployment of Command Group Alpha (See Appendix B for composition), and responsible for Command Group and Special Staff personnel status reports to the RC.

(11) USSOUTHCOM Chaplain will monitor the spiritual and emotional needs of USSOUTHCOM personnel and provide proactive support accordingly.

(12) Security Division will:

(a) Provide USSOUTHCOM Security Clearance and Access Roster information to the DPO (in the form required by the DPO) within six (6) hours of EMERGCON DEFENSE EMERGENCY declaration.

(b) Execute the applicable portions of Appendix A when directed.

(c) Provide USSOUTHCOM Security Clearance and Access Roster information necessary to ensure prompt personnel access to the ACP and/or ECP, as appropriate.

(13) SCSG will assist DPO in coordinating the appropriate medical support during WMD incident and act in accordance with Appendix J to this WMD CM Regulation.

(14) All USSOUTHCOM personnel:

(a) Familiarize themselves with the personal planning guidance in the informational pamphlets prepared and distributed by the Disaster Preparedness Officer (DPO).

(b) All military and civilian employees will report status and whereabouts to a designated directorate point of contact via phone (if phone service is operational) within 6 hours after the JOIC declares a WMD incident.

10. Time Phase Checklists.

a. **General.** The checklists outline major tasks necessary to effectively manage the consequences of a WMD incident affecting USSOUTHCOM Miami facilities. The time available to complete the tasks below may be compressed significantly given the high degree of variability associated with WMD incidents. Checklists are located in Appendix A.

b. **Execution.**

(1) Upon **opening an envelope/package** with a **suspicious powder/substance**, follow **checklist A** at Appendix A.

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- (2) Upon suspecting a suspicious **unopened** letter or package may contain **NBC material**, follow **checklist B** at Appendix A.
- (3) Upon suspecting a **release** of an NBC agent **at or near SOUTHCOM** Miami facilities, follow **checklist C** at Appendix A.
- (4) Upon **J3 concurrence to deploy ACP/ECP**, follow **checklist D** at Appendix A.
- (5) Upon **deployment of ACP/ECP** Advance Team, follow **checklist E** at Appendix A.
- (6) Upon **standup of ACP/ECP**, follow **checklist F** at Appendix A.
- (7) Upon **decision to deploy Command Group Alpha**, follow **checklist G** at Appendix A.
- (8) Upon **deployment of Command Group Alpha** to ACP/ECP, follow **checklist H** at Appendix A.

11. Recovery Operations.

a. Recovery operations will be accomplished as soon as possible after dissipation of WMD incident conditions in the area and conditions permit safe transit to the headquarters. The CoS, with assistance from the USAG-M/DPO, ASA commander, SCEN, SSO, Security Division, SCJ3, and SCJ6, will conduct an assessment of the Headquarters building and all other USSOUTHCOM Miami facilities, and commence restoration in accordance with Appendix E.

b. Within 48 hours after the JOIC discontinues WMD incident response and as conditions permit, all available personnel will report to their directorates to assist in clean-up and restoration of the headquarters. Clean-up will consist of normal cleaning/maintenance as hazardous Material (HAZMAT), WMD/NBC Decontamination, or other designated technical expertise will have rendered the site/HQ safe for USSOUTHCOM staff to return. USSOUTHCOM staff has no equipment, training, or experience in decontamination or remediation of a WMD/NBC site.

c. The JOIC will resume command and control functions in Miami as soon as possible following restoration of critical facility support systems.

The proponent agency of this regulation is the U.S. Southern Command. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements directly to HQ USSOUTHCOM, SCJ337, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172-1217.

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APPENDIX A

TIME-PHASE CHECKLISTS

1. **Purpose.** These detailed checklists provide WMD event response tasks and are primarily intended for use by the DPO, DPR's, the JOIC and the RC. The basic WMD Consequence Management Regulation must be reviewed and understood to fully grasp the concept of operations implemented by this checklist.

2. **General.** With the concurrence of the SCJ3, individual checklists will be implemented at the following milestones:

- a. CHECKLIST "A": Upon opening an envelope/package with a suspicious powder/susbtance at SOUTHCOM Miami facilities.
- b. CHECKLIST "B": Upon suspecting unopened letter/package contains NBC material at SOUTHCOM Miami facilities..
- c. CHECKLIST "C": Upon upon suspecting a release of an NBC agent at or near SOUTHCOM Miami facilities (sheltering in place process).
- d. CHECKLIST "D": Upon J3 Concurrence to deploy ACP/ECP.
- e. CHECKLIST "E": Upon deployment of ACP/ECP Advance Team.
- f. CHECKLIST "F": Upon successful standup of ACP/ECP.
- g. CHECKLIST "G": Upon decision to deploy Command Group Alpha to ACP/ECP.
- h. CHECKLIST "H": Upon deployment of Command Group Alpha to ACP/ECP.

NOTE: The time available between milestones and the time available to complete each checklist may be compressed significantly depending on circumstances. If this plan is implemented on shorter notice, execute the checklist nearest the actual milestone simultaneously with all previous checklists.

2. The JOIC will initiate, maintain, and update the "master" copy of these checklists. The JOIC will pass the master checklist to the RC as part of turnover procedures. The RC will then be responsible for maintaining and updating the checklists. Individuals/teams will report completion of tasks to the JOIC at X3717 or the RC at X3533 by step number (Example: "RC completed step 4.c. of Checklist A at 0459R. ")

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CHECKLIST A

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a. Execute this checklist **upon opening an envelope/package with a suspicious powder/substance** at SOUTHCOM Miami facilities.

STEP #	ACTION FOR:	ACTION	STATUS
1.	SOUTHCOM PERSONNEL WHO OPEN ENVELOPE/ PACKAGE WITH SUSPICIOUS POWDER/ SUBSTANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Do not panic</u> b. DO NOT try to clean up the powder/substance. c. Place or cover contents with anything plastic bag or clothing, paper, or trash can. d. Cover Nose and Mouth with cloth e. Take Frequent Shallow breaths f. DO NOT TASTE, EAT, SMELL, OR TOUCH g. Direct all personnel in the room to leave the room. h. CALL SC DoD Police at 437-COPS (2677). i. LEAVE the room and close the door, or section to others. j. If not in SOUTHCOM HQ building, shut off office air condition/ventilation system k. REMOVE contaminated clothing and wash off with with soap and water. l. List all people who were in the room or area when this suspicious powder was recognized. 	
2.	USAG-M/DOD POLICE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Identify incoming call as potential WMD event and obtain the facts of the incident in accordance with Appendixes K and H. b. If incident occurs in SC HQ building, shut down ventilation system in SC HQ Building (in coordination with JOIC) c. Don personal protective equipment d. Declare DOD/Police (as representative of USAG-M) as on scene Commander, with Commander, USAG-M as overall incident Commander. e. Lock down affected Facility (in coordination with JOIC) f. Determine what tasks from block A.1 (above) have been completed by personnel on the scene prior to your arrival g. Do not reenter affected room. h. Keep all personnel in the affected facility inside in a separate room apart from room where letter or package was opened. i. Contact Miami-Dade Emergency Rescue Personnel with as much information as is possible using Appendix K <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✍ During non-duty hours: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2800 and request to speak to the Desk Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can. ✍ During duty hours: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-1801 and ask to speak to the Police Captain. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to 	

		<p>keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2819 and ask to speak to the Master Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>j. Notify JOIC with as much information as is possible using Appendix K.</p> <p>k. Notify SOUTHCOM SCJ337 FP Officer on duty</p> <p>l. Notify SOUTHCOM Chief of Security. (This needs to happen early on to permit effective protection of classified information.)</p>	
3.	JOIC	<p>a. If incident occurs in SC HQ (Thurman building) shut down ventilation using the JOIC emergency shutdown switch.</p> <p>b. Ensure DoD Police accomplish lock down of affected facility or facilities.</p> <p>c. Determine facts as completely as possible using Appendixes K and H.</p> <p>d. If DOD Police have not already or cannot, Contact Miami-Dade Rescue with as much information as possible using Appendix K</p> <p>✍ During non-duty hours:</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2800 and request to speak to the Desk Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>✍ During duty hours:</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-1801 and ask to speak to the Police Captain. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2819 and ask to speak to the Master Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p>	

		e. Activate WMDCMG and Notify SC Chief of Staff. f. Contact directorates and request they notify their key and essential personnel	
4.	WMDCMG	a. Muster WMDCMG members in CoS (office)* (Note: If event occurs during non-duty hours, do not call personnel into the contaminated facilities) b. Initiate DPO Checklist for HQ building and other SOUTHCOM facilities in Miami (Maintained/updated by DPO)	
5.	Security Division, DoD Police, and Directorate Security Managers	a. Take actions, as appropriate, for expected conditions, to protect classified material and escort first responders (if practicable) in accordance with Appendix C.	
6.	Command Surgeon	a. Prepare clinic to coordinate patient decontamination, if necessary. b. triage potential casualties. c. administer prophylactic treatment for exposure to NBC agents, if necessary. d. collect samples to determine WMD existence, if necessary make patient notifications of testing results. e. Be primary POC to testing lab. f. Have solution in place for after hours treatment.	
7.	SCPAO	a. Take action iaw Appendix I, to include: 1. Handle media relations; 2. Coordinate its activities with other directorates and agencies, such as USAG-Miami; 3. Determine when an announcement of the situation should be made to the news media, what the announcement should say, with whom it should be coordinated, and to whom it should be distributed; 4. Keep detailed records of media contacts, including names and organizations, dates and times, and responses given; 5. Handle all media queries as promptly as possible after determining proper responses to give; 6. Arrange media interviews, when appropriate; 7. Provide news media with information, fact sheets and statistics that help describe the mission of U.S. Southern Command; 8. Provide escorts for news media as required. 9. Conduct coordination with other external organizations as necessary, possibly to include: - Federal Emergency Management Agency - Federal Bureau of Investigation - Environmental Protection Agency - Miami-Dade Fire-Rescue - Miami-Dade Police - Local Hospitals - Red Cross	
8.	EACH DIRECTORATE	a. Provide designated WMD event Work Team members to DPO b. Verify 100% accuracy of STEMS data base c. Execute directorate checklists, as necessary d. Instruct personnel NOT to: (1) call testing facility for results (2) bring exposed personnel into uncontaminated facilities e. Await guidance from CoS and WMDCMG	

CHECKLIST B

b. Execute this checklist upon suspecting **unopened suspicious letter/package contains NBC material** at SOUTHCOM Miami facilities.

STEP #	ACTION FOR:	ACTION	STATUS
1.	PERSONNEL WHO DISCOVER SUSPICIOUS UNOPENED LETTER OR PACKAGE	g. <u>Do not panic</u> h. Cover Nose and Mouth with cloth i. Take Frequent Shallow breaths j. Do not shake or empty the contents of any suspicious envelope or package k. Place the envelope or package in a plastic bag or clothing, paper, or trash can l. Direct all personnel in the room to leave the room. m. Leave the room and close the door, or section to others. n. If not in SOUTHCOM HQ building, shut off office air condition/ventilation system g. REMOVE contaminated clothing and wash off with with soap and water h. List all people who were in the room or area when this suspicious letter or package was recognized i. Call SC DoD Police at 437-COPS (2677)	
2.	USAG-M/DOD POLICE	a. Identify incoming call as potential WMD event and obtain the facts of the incident in accordance with Appendixes K and H b. Don personal protective equipment c. Declare DOD/Police (as representative of USAG-M) as on scene Commander, with Commander, USAG-M as overall incident Commander d. Shut down ventilation system in building (in coordination with JOIC for SC HQ building) e. Lock down affected Facility (in coordination with JOIC) f. Determine what tasks from block b.1 (above) have been completed by personnel on the scene prior to your arrival g. Do not reenter affected room h. Keep all personnel in the affected facility inside in a separate room apart from room where letter or package was opened i. Contact Miami-Dade Emergency Rescue Personnel with as much information as is possible using Appendix K ✍ During non-duty hours: ✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2800 and request to speak to the Desk Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can. ✍ During duty hours: ✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-1801 and ask to speak to the Police Captain. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to	

		<p>keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2819 and ask to speak to the Master Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>j. Notify JOIC with as much information as is possible using Appendix K</p> <p>k. Keep a list of all personnel in the affected facility since introduction of suspected package, regardless of length of time</p> <p>l. Notify FP Officer on duty</p> <p>m. Notify USSOUTHCOM Chief of Security.</p>	
3.	JOIC	<p>a. If incident occurs in SC HQ (Thurman building) shut down ventilation using the JOIC emergency shutdown switch.</p> <p>b. Ensure DOD Police accomplish lock down of affected facility or facilities.</p> <p>c. Determine facts as completely as possible using Appendixes K and H.</p> <p>d. If DOD Police have not already or cannot, Contact Miami-Dade Rescue with as much information as possible using Appendix K</p> <p>✍ During non-duty hours:</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2800 and request to speak to the Desk Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>✍ During duty hours:</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-1801 and ask to speak to the Police Captain. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2819 and ask to speak to the Master Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>e. Activate WMDCMG</p>	2.

		f. Contact directorates and request they notify their key and essential personnel	
4.	WMDCMG	a. Muster WMDCMG members in CoS Office ASAP* (Note: Do not call personnel into the contaminated facilities) b. Initiate DPO Checklist for HQ building and other SOUTHCOM facilities in Miami (Maintained/updated by DPO)	
5.	Security Division, DoD Police, and Directorate Security Managers	a. Take actions, as appropriate, for expected conditions, to protect classified material and escort first responders (if practicable) in accordance with Appendix C.	
6.	Command Surgeon	a. Prepare clinic to coordinate patient decontamination, if necessary. b. triage potential casualties. c. administer prophylactic treatment for exposure to NBC agents, if necessary. d. collect samples to determine WMD existence, if necessary make patient notifications of testing results. e. Have solution in place for after hours treatment.	
7.	SCPAO	a. Take action iaw Appendix I, to include: 1. Handle media relations; 2. Coordinate its activities with other directorates and agencies, such as USAG-Miami; 3. Determine when an announcement of the situation should be made to the news media, what the announcement should say, with whom it should be coordinated, and to whom it should be distributed; 4. Keep detailed records of media contacts, including names and organizations, dates and times, and responses given; 5. Handle all media queries as promptly as possible after determining proper responses to give; 6. Arrange media interviews, when appropriate; 7. Provide news media with information, fact sheets and statistics that help describe the mission of U.S. Southern Command; 8. Provide escorts for news media as required. 9. Conduct coordination with other external organizations as necessary, possibly to include: - Federal Emergency Management Agency - Federal Bureau of Investigation - Environmental Protection Agency - Miami-Dade Fire-Rescue - Miami-Dade Police - Local Hospitals - Red Cross	
8.	EACH DIRECTORATE	a. Provide designated WMD event Work Team members to DPO b. Verify 100% accuracy of STEMS data base c. Execute directorate checklists, as necessary d. Instruct personnel NOT to: (1) call testing facility for results (2) bring exposed personnel into uncontaminated facilities e. Await guidance from CoS and WMDCMG	

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CHECKLIST C

01 Mar 2002

c. Execute this safe haven checklist **upon suspecting a release of an NBC agent** at or near USSOUTHCOM Miami facilities.

STEP #	ACTION FOR:	ACTION	STATUS
1.	WITNESS(ES) TO SUSPECTED AGENT RELEASE	<p>a. Report Incident to DoD Police at 437-COPS (2677) with as much information from Appendix K as possible</p> <p>b. Report to warehouse parking lot and await emergency response personnel/decontamination.</p>	
2.	USAG-M/DOD Police	<p>a. DOD Police on guard outside SC HQ building, close down all entrances to SC buildings (put up barriers, close fences, etc.), as practicable</p> <p>c. DOD Police on guard outside SOUTHCOM HQ facilities, go inside guard houses and close doors</p> <p>d. Shut down building ventilation system (for SC HQ Building, coordinate with JOIC)</p> <p>e. Don personal protective equipment</p> <p>f. Lock down SC HQ Facility (in coordination with JOIC) to include turning off elevators</p> <p>g. Notify JOIC using Appendixes K and H</p> <p>h. Contact Miami-Dade Emergency Personnel with as much information as is possible using Appendix K</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">✍ During non-duty hours:</p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;">✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2800 and request to speak to the Desk Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">✍ During duty hours:</p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;">✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-1801 and ask to speak to the Police Captain. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">OR</p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;">✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2819 and ask to speak to the Master Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>i. Conduct personnel information procedures over the HQ loudspeaker system</p>	

		<p>j. Tape door jams to exterior doors</p> <p>k. Notify USSOUTHCOM Chief of Security.</p>	
3.	JOIC	<p>a. If incident occurs in SC HQ (Thurman building) shut down ventilation using the JOIC emergency shutdown switch.</p> <p>b. Ensure DoD Police accomplish lock down of affected facility or facilities.</p> <p>c. Ensure DoD Police keep command members informed over the HQ loudspeaker system and that door jams to exterior doors have been taped.</p> <p>d. Coordinate determination of potential class of Agent (See appendix H)</p> <p>e. If agent released inside facility, evacuate facility to south parking lot</p> <p>f. If agent released external to facility, continue facility lockdown</p> <p>g. Ensure Local Emergency Authorities have been contacted</p> <p>✍ During non-duty hours:</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2800 and request to speak to the Desk Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>✍ During duty hours:</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-1801 and ask to speak to the Police Captain. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>✍ Call Miami-Dade Police Department Doral District at 305-471-2819 and ask to speak to the Master Sergeant. Specifically request that he or she “telephonically dispatch” an Emergency Hazmat Response Team so as to avoid media eavesdropping of the call. We want to keep these events out of the press as much as we can.</p> <p>h. Notify the SC Chief of Staff.</p> <p>i. When ordered by USCINCO, declare EMERGCN DEFENSE EMERGENCY and FPCON DELTA</p> <p>(1) Issue JOICGRAM (or update JOICGRAM) and OPREP3; include the following:</p> <p>(a) EMERGCN DEFENSE EMERGENCY declaration</p> <p>(b) FPCON DELTA declaration</p> <p>(c) WMD event details</p> <p>(d) Log the time that the event occurred</p> <p>(e) Command actions initiated in response</p>	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> j. Initiate Checklist; pass to RC during situation brief k. Provide situation brief to WMDCMG and RC l. Contact directorates and request they notify their key and essential personnel m. Provide voice and written notification to NMCC and USSOUTHAF, as applicable, of potential USSOUTHCOM relocation n. Notify components of potential USSOUTHCOM relocation o. As requested by the RC, update the 'Command Information Hotline' prerecorded phone message with updates at three hour intervals 	
4.	J3	Activate Disaster Preparation Response Cell (RC) in CAC* (Note: Do not call personnel into the contaminated facilities)	
5.	DPO	Activate WMD event Working Group (WMDCMG) in CoS office* (Note: Do not call personnel into the contaminated facilities)	
6.	RC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Muster Response Cell Team members in CAC* (Note: If event occurs during non-duty hours, do not call personnel into the contaminated facilities) b. Receive situation brief from JOIC c. Receive master copy of checklist from JOIC; assume responsibility for checklist update and maintenance d. Complete Preparations to deploy ACP Advance Team (2) Notify Advance Team Members (3) Release ACP Advance Team personnel to make personal/family preparations until the 48 hr milestone (4) Complete ACP Advance Team air transportation arrangements via commercial air (5) Coordinate ACP Advance Team billeting and ground transportation with SOUTHAF, if necessary (6) Direct SOUTHAF to prepare ACP for use, if necessary e. Notify designated ACP main body personnel p. Request OSA support from TRANSCOM for transport of ACP main body (ACP personnel deploy at CHECKLIST "E" execution). Backup will be commercial air if military transportation is not available q. Notify Command Group Alpha personnel of potential to deploy r. Initiate 'WMD event hotline' prerecorded phone messages with information updated at three hour intervals. Coordinate information with SCPAO (Phone # is 1-888-547-4025, option 1, then option 2: Promulgate number to command via JOICGRAM and web page) 	
7.	WMDCMG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Muster WMDCMG members in CAC* (Note: If event occurs during non-duty hours, do not call personnel into the contaminated facilities) b. Initiate DPO Checklist for HQ building and other SOUTHCOM facilities in Miami (Maintained/updated by DPO) c. Post and maintain event updates on display boards located at the two major headquarters entrances. Post critical advisories on the electronic display board at the North entrance and on the USSOUTHCOM ETV Command Channel (if practicable) 	

8.	METOC	a. Provide continuous METOC updates to Command Group, JOIC, RC, and DPO as to wind and weather conditions and effect on agent release and consequence management operations (e.g. decon, return to operations, return to facilities, etc.)	
9.	Command Surgeon	a. Prepare clinic to coordinate patient decontamination, if necessary b. triage potential casualties c. administer prophylactic treatment for exposure to NBC agents, if necessary d. collect samples to determine WMD existence, if necessary e. Have solution in place for after hours treatment.	
10.	SCPAO	a. Take action iaw Appendix I, to include: 1. Handle media relations; 2. Coordinate its activities with other directorates and agencies, such as USAG-Miami; 3. Determine when an announcement of the situation should be made to the news media, what the announcement should say, with whom it should be coordinated, and to whom it should be distributed; 4. Keep detailed records of media contacts, including names and organizations, dates and times, and responses given; 5. Handle all media queries as promptly as possible after determining proper responses to give; 6. Arrange media interviews, when appropriate; 7. Provide news media with information, fact sheets and statistics that help describe the mission of U.S. Southern Command; 8. Provide escorts for news media as required. 9. Conduct coordination with other external organizations as necessary, possibly to include: - Federal Emergency Management Agency - Federal Bureau of Investigation - Environmental Protection Agency - Miami-Dade Fire-Rescue - Miami-Dade Police - Local Hospitals - Red Cross	
11.	Security Division, DoD Police, and Directorate Security Managers	a. Take actions, as appropriate, for expected conditions, to protect classified material and escort first responders (if practicable) in accordance with Appendix C.	
12.	EACH DIRECTORATE	a. Provide Directorate Preparedness Rep (DPR) to DPO b. Provide designated WMD event Work Team members to DPO c. Provide updated LV/TDY status report to RC J1 representative in the CAC (X3903) d. Verify 100% accuracy of STEMS data base e. Execute directorate checklists, as necessary	

* WMD Consequence Management Group (WMDCMG) - Composition: Disaster Preparedness Officer (DPO)/USAG-M Commander, who acts as the WMDCMG leader and one Disaster Preparedness Representative (DPR) from each Directorate (field grade

officer from J1, J2, J3, J4, J5, J6, ASA, SCSG, and J8, (the DPO is the DPR for USAG-M and SCSJS is the representative for the Command Group and the Chiefs of Special Staff), and one DPR from each off-site facility.

Disaster Preparation Response Cell (RC) - Composition: J35, who acts as the RC leader, 1 X J33 Officer (air ops), 1 X J4 Officer (LRC), 1 X J1 Officer, and 1 X J6 Communications Officer, plus 1 X Security Division representative to implement Appendix C, Emergency Control of Classified Material, if conditions will place headquarters integrity in doubt.

CHECKLIST Dd. Execute this checklist **upon J3 concurrence to deploy ACP/ECP**

STEP #	ACTION FOR:	ACTION	STATUS
1.	JOIC	(1) Update JOICGRAM (2) Notify METOC (if necessary)	
2.	RC	a. With J3 concurrence, deploy ACP/ECP Advance Party (1) Provide names and itinerary to SOUTHAF or Miami-Dade EOC, as applicable; update information as necessary b. If deploying to ACP, complete ACP main body air transportation arrangements via OSA or commercial air c. If deploying to ACP, coordinate ACP main body billeting and ground transportation with SOUTHAF d. Release ACP/ECP main body personnel to complete personal/family preparations; show time at HQ for deployment is _____ e. If deploying to ACP, coordinate Command Group Alpha travel preparations (air transportation, billeting, ground transportation) with the Deputy Chief of Staff and J33 Air Operations f. Draft ACP/ECP deployment message to components and command and control elements of US military activities in the AOR (message to be released by JOIC at checklist C execution) g. If conditions permit, advise directorates to excuse non-essential military members and civilian employees for personal WMD event preparation. Civilian employees can be released for up to four hours without charge of leave (directorates should be prepared to release civilian employees for longer periods with leave charged appropriately)	
3.	DPO	If conditions permit, initiate contract execution for preparation of USSOUTHCOM Miami facilities, including government housing	
4.	ACP/ECP Advance Team	Upon arrival at Davis-Monthan or Miami-Dade EOC, as applicable: a. Report arrival to JOIC b. If deploying to ACP, verify billeting, transportation arrangements for ACP main body c. Energize ACP /ECP systems, computers d. Activate ACP/ECP computer accounts; execute J6 checklist e. Verify connectivity with JOIC via: (1) SIPRNET Email (2) FAX (3) Phone (4) Secure Phone (STU III and Red Phone) (5) TACSAT	
5.	Each Directorate	Execute directorate checklists, as necessary	

CHECKLIST E

e. Execute this checklist upon **deployment of ACP/ECP Advance Team.**

STEP #	ACTION FOR:	ACTION	STATUS
1.	JOIC	a. Update JOICGRAM b. Transmit ACP/ECP deployment message to components and command and control elements of US military activities in the AOR (message provided by RC) c. Transmit request for "minimize of record traffic for USSOUTHCOM" and/or portion of AOR affected by the WMD event ("Minimize" means that only essential message traffic will be transmitted to USSOUTHCOM) d. As soon as ACP/ECP personnel arrive at Davis-Monthan or Miami-Dade EOC, as applicable, and the watch is established; (1) Share all current information/documents with the ACP/ECP (2) Parallel all information updates with ACP/ECP until J3 directive to transfer command and control to ACP/ECP (3) Report "ACP/ECP ready" to RC once connectivity is verified and all current operational information has been shared with ACP/ECP (4) Transmit ACP/ECP activation message with phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and PLA	
2.	RC	a. With concurrence of J3, deploy ACP/ECP main body b. If deploying to ACP, provide ACP names and itinerary to SOUTHAF c. Deliver ACP/ECP deployment message to JOIC for release d. Report ACP/ECP Ready to J3 after JOIC reports same to RC	
3.	ACP	Upon arrival of main body at Davis-Monthan or Miami-Dade EOC, as applicable: (1) Report arrival to JOIC (2) Draw and inventory EA COMSEC material (3) Station first watch section (4) Share information with JOIC (5) Report to JOIC when the ACP/ECP is ready to assume all command and control functions NOTE: Dual message routing is accomplished via J6 checklist referred to in checklist D.	
4.	DPO	a. Monitor WMD event preparation contract execution b. Fuel all government vehicles c. Top off emergency generator fuel supply at 100%	
5.	Security Division	Execute WMD event preparations as directed and necessary, in accordance with Appendix C	
6.	Each Directorate	a. Verify STEMS personnel data base, report verification to RC (X3903/3523/3525) b. Update LV/TDY list as necessary, report changes (negative reports required) to RC (X3903/3523/3525) c. Execute directorate checklists, as necessary d. Secure sensitive equipment and power down computer systems.	

CHECKLIST F

f. Execute this checklist upon **successful standup of ACP/ECP.**

STEP #	ACTION FOR:	ACTION	STATUS
1.	JOIC	(1) Update JOICGRAM (2) Notify NMCC and component commands of termination of all non-essential staff functions	
2.	DPO	If conditions permit, with concurrence of J3, release all non-essential military personnel and civilian employees to conduct family/household consequence management	
3.	Each Directorate	As directed by DPO, release non-essential personnel from headquarters	
4.	ASA	a. Commence shutdown/backup of non-critical computer systems in accordance with Appendix D. b. Backup critical computer files (JOIC + CAC)	

CHECKLIST G

g. Execute this checklist UPON **decision to deploy Command Group Alpha to ACP/ECP**

STEP #	ACTION FOR:	ACTION	STATUS
1.	JOIC	a. Prepare and transmit message to NMCC providing CINC travel itinerary if necessary b. Notify ACP/ECP of CINC intentions/itinerary, regardless of decision to deploy	
2.	RC	Upon COS direction, deploy Command Group Alpha a. Provide names and itinerary to SOUTHAF b. Provide itinerary to JOIC for preparation of CINC status message to NMCC	
3.	DPO	a. Coordinate building security requirements with DOD police b. Initiate and maintain a roster of all personnel present in headquarters building	
4.	ASA	Secure systems as available in coordination with the DPO and RC	

CHECKLIST Hh. Execute this upon **deployment of Command Group Alpha to ACP/ECP**

STEP #	ACTION FOR:	ACTION	STATUS
1.	JOIC	<p>a. When directed by USCINCSO, declare EMERCON “DEFENSE EMERGENCY”</p> <p>(1) Update JOICGRAM</p> <p>(2) Notify NMCC via voice communications</p> <p>(3) Notify components via voice communications</p> <p>b. When communications can not be maintained and, at the direction of the J3, transfer command and control to the ACP/ECP</p> <p>(1) Notify NMCC and components/subordinates of transfer via voice and record message traffic</p> <p>(2) Verify ACP/ECP has the same operational information and documentation as JOIC.</p> <p>(3) JOIC Watch Captain conduct voice turnover to ACP/ECP Watch Captain and, when both agree, transfer command and control responsibility to the ACP/ECP</p> <p>(4) Make appropriate JOIC log entries concerning shift of command and control responsibilities to the ACP/ECP</p> <p>(5) Secure all systems in an orderly manner</p> <p>(6) Inventory and secure COMSEC material</p> <p>(7) Ensure CINC COMO/RED SWITCH operators zeroize equipment prior to departure</p> <p>(8) Evacuate headquarters building , if determined safe by competent medical authority, and only as necessary and as directed by the J3. If conditions do not permit safe transit, remain in the headquarters</p>	
2.	RC	<p>a. Upon COS direction, deploy Command Group Alpha</p> <p>(1) Provide names and itinerary to SOUTHAF</p> <p>(2) Provide itinerary to JOIC/ACP/ECP for preparation of CINC location message to NMCC</p> <p>b. RC direct ASA to notify automatic switching centers of headquarters evacuation and transfer of command and control to the ACP. Switch all incoming message traffic and radio comms to ACP/ECP upon transfer.</p> <p>c. With the exception of essential RC members remaining to initiate reconstitution, evacuate headquarters building as necessary and safe as directed by the J3. If conditions do not permit safe transit, remain in the headquarters</p> <p>d. Receive and record personnel status reports throughout storm passage, as support systems allow</p>	
3.	DPO	<p>a. Direct WMDCMG to evacuate headquarters building as necessary. If conditions do not permit safe transit, remain in the headquarters</p> <p>b. Report completion of USSOUTHCOM facility preparations to J3.</p> <p>c. Account for all personnel remaining in building. Designated DOD security force and essential members of the RC are the minimum personnel required to remain in the headquarters.</p> <p>d. Record all significant events noted during storm passage to</p>	

		assist in reconstitution actions. e. Initiate reconstitution in accordance with Appendix E as soon as possible	
4.	ASA	Secure systems as available in coordination with the DPO and RC	

APPENDIX B**USCINCSO CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLAN (COOP)**

1. **Purpose.** The USCINCSO Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) provides guidance and establishes responsibility for ensuring continuity of operations when normal JOIC operations from USSOUTHCOM Headquarters in Miami, FL are threatened or impaired. This plan specifically addresses actions to be taken in response to a major WMD Consequence Management which threatens the headquarters.

2. **References.**

- a. SC Reg 10-3, USSOUTHCOM CAT Procedures

3. **Definitions.** See Appendix F for definitions.

4. **Applicability.** This plan applies to HQ USSOUTHCOM and subordinate commands as tasked herein.

5. **Execution.** USSOUTHCOM maintains an alternate location from which command, control, and communications can be exercised. Activation and movement to the alternate location occurs when the imminent forecasted situation precludes the continued operation of the USSOUTHCOM JOIC and/or Command and Staff activity at USSOUTHCOM HQ, Miami, FL.

6. **Concept of Operations.** The concept of operations for continuity of command and control in the event of a major WMD Consequence Management threatening the Miami area is contained in the basic WMD Consequence Management Regulation. Activation of the ACP/ECP will be accomplished as promulgated in Appendix A. Initial activation and evacuation of key personnel to the ACP/ECP are based upon the assumption that the ACP/ECP will not be required for more than one week. If the Miami Headquarters cannot be reconstituted within that time frame, additional personnel, as designated by each directorate, will be required to man the ACP/ECP and continue operations.

7. **Facilities.**

a. Location. The USSOUTHCOM ACP/ECP is located at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ. When staffed, the ACP/ECP consists of a CINC's office, JOIC, STO, JIC, and CAT area. 12 AF/CC provides space for these functions during actual contingencies. The following facilities have been designated by 12 AF for ACP/ECP use:

(1) Rm 131 at Bldg 12: CAT area. If this location is not available, CAT will operate from the mezzanine at Bldg 72. SCJ2's and SCJ3's office space is at Bldg 12, Rm 130 (Battlecab). Bldg 12, Rm 123A is designated for Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC) operations. The 12 AF COS will designate an appropriate space for use by the CINC. The CINC's office area must have enough space to accommodate the CINC XO, Aide de Camp, and an

administration Clerk. Bldg 12, Rm 119 will be used for Special Technical Operations (STO). ACP/ECP communications servers, Red Switch, and tactical satellite radios are located in Bldg 12, Rooms 124 and 125.

(2) USSOUTHCOM JIC personnel will work at Bldg 75.

b. ACP/ECP Communications. Communications requirements for the ACP/ECP are at Appendix D. The ACP/ECP must be ready for immediate activation. Communication systems and office equipment required to operate the ACP/ECP are pre-positioned. USSOUTHCOM personnel will exercise the ADP and office equipment annually prior to the commencement of WMD Consequence Management season.

8. Succession of Command. If USCINCSO becomes incapacitated, command succession is as follows: DCINC, CoS, SCJ3, SCJ2, SCJ5, or next senior officer within USSOUTHCOM HQ staff eligible to exercise command, regardless of service affiliation, until relieved by JCS.

9. Designation of Alternate JOIC. In the event circumstances preclude movement of the command element to the ACP/ECP, (i.e., incapacitation or total destruction of the HQ), the command and control functions will be transferred to an alternate JOIC. USSOUTHCOM JOIC succession:

- a. Headquarters 12 AF, Davis Monthan AFB, AZ
- b. Headquarters USARSO, Ft. Buchanan, Puerto Rico

10. Security and Reconstitution of HQ Miami. Following the transfer of USSOUTHCOM command and control functions to the ACP/ECP, the Chief of Staff via USAG -M is responsible for the security of the HQ. USAG-M will:

- a. Account for all USSOUTHCOM personnel remaining in the headquarters during WMD event (The RC will provide accountability for all other command personnel).
- b. Coordinate with SCJ2 Security Division and directorate Security Managers to account for, secure, and transfer to the ACP/ECP or destroy (with SCJ2 and COS approval) classified documents.
- c. Provide for the Physical Security of the building, with special attention to SCIF areas.
- d. As directed in the basic WMD Consequence Management regulation, coordinate with the RC to direct reconstitution of the HQ.

11. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. **USSOUTHCOM Staff:** Carry out duties as designated in the basic WMD Consequence Management Regulation.

b. 12 AF/CC:

(1) If the ACP/ECP cannot be activated for any reason and USSOUTHCOM is unable to perform command and control functions from its Miami Headquarters or its local Alternate JOIC, 12 AF/CC will execute command and control until the CINC is able to resume C2 functions in the Miami area. Maintain contact with NMCC and assigned forces. Establish communications with the other component operations.

(2) Provide billeting, work areas, communications, and transportation:

(a) Billeting—Provide lodging for approximately 45 personnel. Personnel will deploy in three teams: Advance ACP/ECP team (11 personnel), Command Group Alpha (approximately 12 personnel), and the ACP/ECP Main Body (21 personnel). Advance Team chief (USSOUTHCOM JOIC Chief) will provide number of personnel to 355th AF Wing Command Center prior to deployment and confirm numbers with billeting upon arrival. See Annex 1.

(b) Office Space—

- ? Provide the following work areas and required office furniture for USSOUTHCOM:
- ? Rm 123 A, Bldg 12: Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC) operations.
- ? CINC office and support group area (seven work stations) in Bldg 12—TBD by 12th AF CoS upon notification of ACP/ECP deployment.
- ? Rm 119, Bldg 12: Special Technical Operations (STO) office and use of STO equipment.
- ? Rm 131, Bldg 12: Crisis Action Team (18 work stations) and J2 & J3 office. If Rm 131 is not available, the mezzanine at Bldg 72 will be used.
- ? Integration of USSOUTHCOM JIC personnel into 612th operations at Bldg 75 to support Indications and Warning, Photo Interpretation, and Intelligence Analysis Requirements.
- ? Rooms 124 and 125, Bldg 12: Radio room (five radios), ACP/ECP ADP support room, and storage area.
- ? Use of VTC in Rm 116, Bldg 12.

(3) Communications.

(a) USSOUTHCOM will provide and pre-position all required communications equipment (Annex 2). 612th Communications Sqdn will be responsible for ensuring secure storage of equipment. The ACP/ECP J6 COMMO is accountable for all equipment on hand - receipt.

(b) Upon notification of ACP/ECP activation, 612th Communications Sqdn will assist the J6 Advance Team to establish and confirm communications connectivity (SIPRNET, NIPRNET) in support of Crisis Action Team work at mezzanine at Bldg 72 if Rm 131 at Bldg 12 is not available. Provide, as required, technical support to JOIC.

(c) Assist J6 party to setup five UHF SATCOM antennas vicinity Bldg 12. Antennas are stored in Radio Room, Rm 124, Bldg 12. USSOUTHCOM Advance Team will provide key resources and key radios on occupation of ACP/ECP.

(d) Support COMSEC requirements as necessary. USSOUTHCOM SCJ2A will coordinate USASA-SOUTHCOM COMSEC Custodian and with 12th AF COMSEC custodian prior to deployment and confirm support needed upon arrival of ACP/ECP Advance Team.

c. Transportation.

(1) Provide transportation for ACP/ECP advance team, ACP/ECP main body and Command Group Alpha personnel from the point of arrival at Tucson, AZ to Davis Monthan AFB, AZ.

(2) Provide two 12 Passenger Vans to meet daily ACP/ECP transportation requirements.

(3) Provide transportation for ACP/ECP equipment and material upon arrival at Davis Monthan, AFB, AZ to designated operation areas. Provide transportation for staff from billeting area to ACP/ECP area.

d. Provide security and storage for ACP/ECP equipment and classified areas.

e. Provide medical support to ACP/ECP personnel.

ANNEX 1

PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR MANNING OF ACP/ECP/ECP

1. Purpose. To outline the composition of the ACP/ECP Advance Team, ACP/ECP Main Body, and Command Group Alpha. Personnel will be assigned by the appropriate directorates and maintain the ability to deploy to the ACP/ECP. These personnel must be replaced if assigned TDY or granted.

2. ACP/ECP Advance Team (11)

- a. *1 X Comm Officer (OIC)*
- b. *1 X CSP Administrator from ASA for J2*
- c. *1 X Message NCO*
- d. *1 X GCCS/LAN Operator*
- e. *2 X Radio Operator*
- f. *1 X J2 Liaison Officer*
- g. *1 X General Dynamics Hardware Contractor (J2)*
- h. *1 X General Dynamics Software Contractor (J2)*
- i. *1 X J2 ADP System Administrator(J2)*
- j. *1 X J2 ADP System Supervisor(J2)*
- k. *1 X JOIC Watch NCO(must have IMPAC card)*
- l. *1 X SCSG Representative*
- m. *1 x SCJ2 SSO Representative*

3. ACP/ECP Main Body (24)

- a. *1 X Comm Officer (to sustain 24-hr ops)*
- b. *1 X J1 Personnel Officer*
- c. *2 X Intel Watch Officers*
- d. *2 X Intel NCO's*
- e. *2 X CSG Watchstanders*
- f. *2 X ELINT Watchstanders*
- g. *4 X Imagery Analysts*
- h. *1 X O-6 JOIC ACP/ECP Team Leader from J3*
- i. *2 X JOIC Watch Captains*
- j. *2 X Ops Watch Officers*
- k. *2 X Ops NCO's*
- l. *2 X STO*

4. Command Group Alpha (9 + PSD)

- a. *CINC*
- b. *CINC XO*
- c. *CINC AIDE*
- d. *COS*
- e. *SJS*
- f. *J2*
- g. *J3*
- h. *J4*

- i. *CINC COMMO*
- j. *CINC Personal Security Detachment (PSD)*

ANNEX 2

ALTERNATE/EMERGENCY COMMAND POST COMMUNICATIONS AND EQUIPMENT

1. GENERAL. This Annex prescribes unique ACP/ECP communications arrangements, and specifies related responsibilities.

2. Communication Requirements. The ACP/ECP requires the following C2 Systems and connectivity:

a. C2 Systems: CSG, SIMS, GCCS, GCCS-T, PDS, AMHS, CJCSAN, UHF Radios (five radios), Telephones, and VTC.

b. Connectivity: SPIRNET, NIPRNET, JWICS, Telephone (DSN, Commercial, FTS), DRSN, NSTS, and UHF SATCOM.

3. Office equipment requirements include Classified and Unclassified Faxes, B/W and Color Printers, Copiers, STU III telephones, Red phones, PCs, and Televisions.

4. Distribution and Quantity of equipment and C2 Systems. See Annex 3 for location of below listed facilities:

Equipment	CINC	JOIC	JIC	STO	CAT	Total
SIMS		5	5			10
SIMS Servers			3			3
JDISS NT Server			4			4
Tape Robot			1			1
Tape Drives		2				2
SIPRNET-GCCS		1				1
MDITDS Server			1			1
SMART			1			1
PCs		4	6		20	30
NIPRNET-PCs		1				1
JWICS-VTC						1
Printers B&W		1	3			4
Printers Color			1			1
Scanner/OCR			1			1
FAX Unclas			1			1
FAX Class		1	1			2
Red Phones		2	1			3
STU-IIIs		6	6		9	21
UHF SATCOM (5 NETS)		5				5
TV		1				1
Copier			1			1

ANNEX 3


ACP FACILITIES

1. ACP is composed of five facilities: CINC area, JOIC, JIC, STO, and CAT. These are as are at three different locations on Davis Monthan AFB, AZ:

a. Bldg 12:

- (1) Rm 130 (Battlecab): J2 and J3 office
- (2) Rm 123A: Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC) operations
- (3) Rm 116, 118 and 117: CINC office to include CINC XO, Aide de Camp, Personal Security Detachment, Administration Clerk
- (4) Rm 119: Special Technical Operations (STO)
- (5) Rms 124 & 125: Communications servers, Red Switch, radios, and ADP storage

b. Bldg 72 mezzanine: ACP cadre operations (does not include JIC personnel); and a mobile air operations center (MAOC) trailer located by Bldg 75 – JIC operations. See diagram below



APPENDIX C**EMERGENCY EVACUATION/HANDLING AND DESTRUCTION OF
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL**

1. **Purpose.** Provide procedures for the protection and evacuation of classified material due to possible WMD Event destruction/damage to USSOUTHCOM. This Appendix applies to all USSOUTHCOM facilities in the Miami area.
2. **Concept of Operations.** In the event of a WMD attack, the affected area, including individuals who are exposed to the attack, should be quarantined. Although unlikely, destruction of classified holdings may be required should the structural integrity and physical security of USSOUTHCOM Miami facilities be threatened or compromised by a WMD event.
3. **General.** Exposed classified equipment and documents, as well as personnel, should remain in the affected area until a HAZMAT team arrives to determine the severity of the attack and to prevent contamination of unaffected areas and personnel. Upon direction from the COS and notification from SCJ2 and USSOUTHCOM Security Division, the following procedures will be executed:
 - a. Emergency personnel such as DoD Police, Miami-Dade County Police, firefighters, and HAZMAT personnel will not be restricted from entry to USSOUTHCOM facilities (including the SCIF) in order to address an emergency situation. Any emergency organization's personnel responding to an emergency, to include DoD Police, will be allowed access to the building and the SCIF to address and respond to the emergency.
 - b. USAG-M Force Protection Office will provide the Security Division personal identifying data (name, date of birth, place of birth, and SSAN) and copy of birth certificate/drivers license/passport/alien registration/work visa of non-DoD emergency personnel (police, firefighters, HAZMAT, etc.) who require(d) entry to USSOUTHCOM Headquarters or satellite facilities (including SCIF). USAG-M Force Protection Office will identify DoD Police who require(d) entry to the SCIF.
 - c. Security Division will perform routine security vetting procedures and have uncleared personnel execute a non-disclosure agreement as soon as practicable. If SAP material is involved, SCJ3-STO will also have emergency personnel execute a non-disclosure agreement as soon as practicable.
 - d. If classified material must be removed from the affected area (USSOUTHCOM or the Satellite sites), then a representative from the Security Division and/or Special Access Program (SAP) personnel will assess whether to accompany the classified material until

it is released back to our control.

f. All directorate security managers will ensure that all classified material under their security cognizance is accounted for. Security managers will ensure that all areas under their purview are appropriately sanitized and provide full accountability for all materials identified for destruction.

g. Classified material identified for destruction due to contamination should be burned. This would require a representative from the Security Division, SAP office, and/or directorate security manager to accompany the HAZMAT team to an authorized burn site to ensure the information is properly destroyed. DoD Police and/or Metro Dade law enforcement should provide an armed escort when transporting classified equipment and material to the authorized burn site.

h. The Security Division will ensure the following requirements are met:

(1) Verify that HAZMAT team members are U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or have a valid work visa.

(2) Perform security vetting procedures on all emergency personnel as soon as practicable.

(3) If emergency personnel are exposed to classified information, ensure non-disclosure agreements are executed and appropriately filed.

(4) Ensure HAZMAT team members are appropriately escorted throughout the USSOUTHCOM facility. Escort will be provided by DoD Police in common areas and by directorate Security Managers within directorate areas. Escort responsibility will transfer from non-exposed personnel to exposed personnel within directorate areas.

(5) Ensure appropriate security measures are coordinated and executed in the event that contaminated classified material is required for forensic or evidentiary purposes.

i. United States Army Garrison will ensure the following requirements are met:

(1) DoD Police are available to escort classified equipment and material to an authorized burn site in the event exposed classified material must be destroyed.

(2) Ensure Security Division and SAP personnel have access to protective gear in the event they must accompany the HAZMAT team into an affected area.

(3) Establish a staging area for decontamination of classified information, equipment, and personnel in the event a small area is affected by WMD.

(4) Ensure the command has the required amount of packing material (bags, boxes, etc) to package classified equipment and material in the event they must be taken outside the facility for decontamination or destruction.

j. Directorate security managers will:

(1) Establish appropriate WMD destruction procedures within their respective organizations.

(2) Ensure two person teams are designated to assist in destruction operations of Top Secret collateral information.

(3) Be available to accompany HAZMAT, DoD Police, USSOUTHCOM Security Division, and/or special program access personnel into their respective areas in the event of a WMD attack.

k. Destruction priorities are as follows:

(1) PRIORITY ONE: All cryptographic equipment and documents, extremely sensitive SCI programs (NASP, TB) and STO SAP.

(2) PRIORITY TWO: All operational SCI codeword material that might divulge targets and successes, documents dealing with US SCI activities and documents concerning compartmented projects and other sensitive intelligence materials, TOP SECRET collateral and SPECAT. All superseded and current keying material in that order except for authenticators, CONFIDENTIAL tactical operations codes.

(3) PRIORITY THREE: Less sensitive administrative SCI material and collateral classified material not included above. All keying material that will become effective within the next 30 days. All superseded authenticators and tactical operations codes.

(4) PRIORITY FOUR: FOUO, SBU, Privacy Act, and other sensitive information. Maintenance manuals and classified assemblies of COMSEC equipment. All remaining COMSEC material and equipment. This includes devices used to encrypt our links/systems and CCI material (fill/electronic devices and STU-III/STE/Red phones).

4. **Tasks and Conditions.** The Chief, Security Division is the command authority responsible for the protection of all classified material. The Special Security Officer (SSO) is responsible for safeguarding and destruction of SCI material. The SCJ3 STO is responsible for safeguarding and destruction of STO SAP material. The Security Operations Officer (SOO) is responsible for safeguarding and destruction of collateral classified information. Directorate/office security managers within the Thurman building and satellite facilities are responsible for safeguarding and destruction of classified

material within their workspaces. These procedures are intended to prepare for emergency conditions and to provide safeguards for classified materials under such conditions. The success of these procedures depends upon the familiarity of all personnel with their responsibilities, adherence to preparatory actions, and rapid execution.

a. Preparatory actions:

(1) Each security manager will inventory classified holdings within their respective office and ensure all containers, boxes, safes, or cabinets holding classified material are labeled according to the sensitivity of the contents.

(2) Each security manager will ensure personnel in their office review classified holdings on a continuous basis retaining only that information required for operational needs.

ANNEXES:

1. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Special Programs and Special Access Program Facilities/Areas
2. Protection of Communication Security (COMSEC) Material

1. **Purpose.** This appendix provides guidance in the event a WMD agent is discovered/introduced in a controlled facility securing either Special SCI and/or Special Access Program (SAP) material/systems.
2. **References.**
 - a. US Southern Command SCI Facilities Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Security, 14 November 1997.
 - b. Office of Naval Operations, NAVSIM REV 7, 11 Jun 1999.
 - c. SC Reg 10-3, USSOUTHCOM CAT Procedures
 - d. Memorandum dtd 12 October, 2001, SOP for Alarm Response and Access for the Telephone Booth (TB) Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).
3. **Definitions.** See Appendix F for definitions.
4. **Applicability.** This Appendix applies to Special Security Office and TB indoctrinated personnel, SAP managers in charge of facilities securing SAP material/systems.
5. **Execution.** Security Managers will keep the amount of material unsecured in appropriate containers to an absolute minimum to reduce the chance of exposure to classified material in the event the facility must be immediately evacuated. Personnel in the facility will follow established checklists in Appendix A for emergency actions.
6. **Concept of Operations.** After the initial actions outlined in Appendix A have been accomplished, operations to locate, identify, and decontaminate may require HAZMAT Teams to enter an SCI/SAP facility. The following procedures will be taken to ensure security of the material and information located in the facility:
 - a. In most cases all individuals entering a SCI or SAP facility will be escorted by a designated, trained SSO/SAP cleared individual from the respective facility. Individuals with SCI access are authorized to escort individuals into the sensitive facilities after coordinating with the Chief, SSO or his representative for SCI facilities to include the STO, TB, and SSO areas. When immediate access is required for safety considerations, and no SCI or SAP -cleared individuals are available, individuals will be escorted by DoD Police personnel. Locations to the combinations to the facilities are identified below.
 - b. SSO/SAP Managers/DoD police escorts will ensure that no unauthorized individuals try to access systems, safes or materials located in the facility beyond that required in the performance of their HAZMAT duties.
 - c. SSO/SAP Managers/DoD police escorts will note and record all individuals entering sensitive facilities.

d. SSO and SAP managers will notify program managers and the cognizant security authority (CSA) of the situation and actions being taken to ensure the security of the material and systems.

e. If material/equipment is required to be removed from the facility, the HAZMAT team, through the DoD police, will notify the SAP manager and SSO of the material/equipment required to be removed. The material will be fully documented prior to packaging and will be verified by a second SSO/SAP manager/DoD SCI accessed individual. No material/equipment will be removed from any SCI/SAP facility without prior approval and coordination from the SSO or SAP program manager. The facility manager will coordinate any transportation operations of any classified material/equipment.

f. An SCI accessed/SAP cleared individual must accompany/escort the material to a destruction facility to ensure complete and proper destruction. All SCI and SAP material destruction will be recorded on DA Form 3964.

g. If access to a safe is required, the HAZMAT team, through the DoD police, will notify the SSO/SAP manager prior to the opening of a safe. The SSO/SAP manager will provide combination to the required safe(s) as required. DoD police escorts will ensure that only actions required in the performance of the HAZMAT duties are performed. If any document or equipment is removed from the safe, it will be fully logged and accounted for prior to any action being taken.

h. Upon completion of HAZMAT operations in a SCI/SAP facility, those un-cleared individuals entering SCI/SAP facilities will be debriefed and execute an inadvertent disclosure statement (NDA) and/or a non-disclosure statement (NDA).

i. Upon receiving the ALL CLEAR signal, SSO/SAP managers will re-enter their facilities and conduct an inspection and inventory of all material and equipment. A report of the incident will be submitted to the CSA and/or program manager with copies furnished to the SSO and CoS, USSOUTHCOM. Any discrepancies will be reported to the program manager and chain of command immediately.

7. Facilities.

a. Location. There is one SSO office and three SAP facilities/areas located in the USSOUTHCOM HQs Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF):

(1) Room 2226, SCJ2-SSO: located on the east side of the bldg on the second floor. The combination to the door and emergency swipe card is located in the JOIC in the watch officer's safe. SSO Emergency contact numbers are available from the JOIC watch officer.

(2) Room 2401, SCJ336: located at the top of the stairs on the north side in the center of the building. The combination to the door and emergency swipe card is located in the JOIC in watch officer's safe. STO Emergency contact names and numbers are on file with the JOIC.

(3) Room 2215D, SARA Office: located on the second floor, in the National Agency Reps' office area in the southwest corner of the building. The combination to the door, alarm cipher and door cipher codes are available from the SARA reps and are also held in a sealed envelope in the SSO office safe. For access to the SARA office without escort by a SARA rep (in the event of HAZMAT situation or incapacitation of SARA reps), contact SARA headquarters for identification of proper escort. In the event that neither is available, entry will be permitted under SSO emergency procedures. Emergency access to the SARA office will be allowed in the event of a WMD incident, when a SARA representative is unable to accompany the HAZMAT team. SSO or JOIC personnel are authorized to escort DoD Police and/or HAZMAT personnel in this scenario.

(3) Room 2206B, Telephone Booth (TB): located in room 2206 on the north side of the building, on the east side of the SCIF. The combination to the door is located in the JOIC watch officer's safe. TB contact numbers are available in reference d.

ANNEX 2 TO APPENDIX C

PROTECTION OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY (COMSEC) MATERIAL

1. Protection of Communication Security (COMSEC) Material. This annex outlines actions necessary to protect COMSEC material in USSOUTHCOM during a WMD Event. This guidance is applicable to all personnel and organizations operating under USSOUTHCOM control. Questions regarding the procedures outlined in this annex should be directed to SCJ62, Information Assurance.

a. Responsibilities. The COMSEC Hand Receipt holders/Custodians and STU-III Responsible Officers (SRO) in every Directorate or organization are responsible for the emergency safeguarding and destruction of COMSEC materials. All personnel and organizations operating under USSOUTHCOM control should review these procedures, take the necessary actions and, upon proper notification and direction, execute the emergency procedures of this plan.

b. Task and conditions. These procedures are intended to prepare for emergency conditions and to provide safeguards for COMSEC materials. Preparatory actions are listed below.

(1) All COMSEC Hand Receipt holders/Custodians and SRO should review these procedures quarterly.

(2) COMSEC Hand Receipt holders/Custodians and SRO should review holdings on a continuous basis with the intent of retaining only that which is required for operational needs.

(3) Mark all containers holding COMSEC material. This marking will aid in the rapid identification of COMSEC material for safeguarding or destruction if required.

c. Securing COMSEC materials.

(1) Notification during non-duty hours.

(a) Division Chiefs will notify all responsible COMSEC Hand Receipt holders/Custodians and SRO of the event.

(b) COMSEC Hand Receipt holders/Custodians and SRO personnel will respond as directed and follow procedures as outlined in the subsequent paragraphs.

(2) Notification during duty hours.

(a) Division/Office Chiefs will inform all on-duty personnel of the event.

- (b) Personnel will review procedures for securing COMSEC materials in containers previously marked (IAW b (3)).
- (c) When directed,
 - ? Secure all COMSEC key material/devices not in use, to include the collection/consolidation of STU-III keys not in use.
 - ? Conduct an inventory of all assigned COMSEC materials to ensure 100% accountability. This includes all keying material and controlled cryptographic items (CCI), such as encryption device securing systems and STU-III telephones.
 - ? Ensure all containers are locked as appropriate.
 - ? When directed, all COMSEC materials will be secured at the pre-designated (for each Directorate) location.
 - ? Contact the ASA-USSOUTHCOM COMSEC Manager (437-1944/1915/1986) to advise of accountability and to receive additional COMSEC guidance as required.

2. Destruction. Although highly unlikely, it may be advisable to destroy all or a portion of the COMSEC materials rather than securing or evacuating in response to a WMD Event. Should this condition occur, follow the instructions below:

a. Emergency destruction is a drastic reaction to a situation that may result in the physical loss of COMSEC material and is the last action when the threat leaves no other option. All responsible personnel will need to ensure they have appropriate “tools” (sledge hammers, axes, etc...) to accomplish destruction of COMSEC materials and devices.

b. Upon notification, COMSEC Hand Receipt holders/Custodians and SRO will perform destruction in the following COMSEC-specific priority:

(1) PRIORITY ONE - All superseded and current keying material in that order except for authenticators, CONFIDENTIAL tactical operations codes.

(2) PRIORITY TWO - All keying material which is to become effective within the next 30 days.

(3) PRIORITY THREE - All superseded authenticators and tactical operations codes.

(4) PRIORITY FOUR - Maintenance manuals and classified assemblies of COMSEC equipment.

(5) PRIORITY FIVE - All remaining COMSEC material and equipment. This includes devices used to encrypt our links/systems and CCI material (fill/electronic devices and STU-III/Red phones).

3. Contact the ASA-USSOUTHCOM COMSEC Manager to advise of the actions taken and material destroyed.

APPENDIX D**COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS**

1. **Purpose.** This Appendix provides instructions and guidance for command and control, communications, and computer (C4) systems support .
2. **Concept of Operations.** To provide C4 systems support required to protect USSOUTHCOM resources and personnel to the maximum extent possible from the effects of a WMD Event, recover mission capability, and to provide continuity of operations throughout the crisis period.
3. **General.**
 - a. Guiding Principles.
 - (1) The Director, Command and Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate (SCJ6), is responsible for coordination of all non-SCI C4I connectivity matters.
 - (2) Communications and computer systems will be governed IAW this Appendix.
 - (3) Existing fixed communications systems, civilian and military, will be used to the maximum extent possible. Cellular telephone and STU-III use is expected to be extensive.
 - (4) USSOUTHCOM will participate in Metro Dade emergency communications network, with assets distributed by SCJ6.
4. **Procedures.**
 - a. As directed in the basic WMD Consequence Management Regulation, a RC and WMDCMG will be activated at USSOUTHCOM Headquarters. Using existing communications circuits, the JOIC/RC/WMDCMG will direct disaster preparedness and evacuation operations involving USSOUTHCOM assets and personnel. The JOIC/RC/WMDCMG will continue operations until unable or directed to transfer to the ACP, at which point the command and control function may be transferred to the ACP at SOUTHAF Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ or the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center (MDEOC). USSOUTHCOM personnel will utilize radio nets as specified in Annex 1 to this Appendix. JOIC/RC/WMDCMG operations will be terminated at the discretion of the J3.
 - b. After the WMD Event passes, USCINCSO will resume C2 functions at USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, or will remain with his key staff at the ACP if operations cannot be resumed in the Miami HQ. During relocation from Davis Monthan AFB, AZ, USCINCSO will require UHF TACSAT communications while en route to the alternate

headquarters aboard his aircraft. Additional UHF TACSAT nets, Defense Switch Network (DSN) access, Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN), Global Command and Control System (GCCS), VTC, JWICS, SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and AUTODIN/DMS (both GENSER and DSSCS) service will be required at the alternate headquarters.

5. Tasking.

a. When directed by the SCJ3, SCJ6 will:

(1) Establish UHF TACSAT communications IAW Annex 1 to this Appendix. (SCJ3/SCJ6)

(2) Prepare and transmit the following messages.

(a) A request for 93rd Signal Bde (or assigned unit) assets to assist with restoration, and be prepared to provide current C4I capability.

(b) A message requesting MINIMIZE for all non-essential message traffic destined for USSOUTHCOM during the period that the WMD event affects the Miami Area.

(3) The following actions are accomplished by the ACP J6 COMMO checklist:

(a) A request for activation of temporary DSSCS and GENSER NARCS, Routing Indicators (R/I), and Plain Language Addresses (PLA) if USSOUTHCOM decides to relocate to the ACP.

(b) Notify NMCC of ACP DSRN/DSN numbers and MSG Address for JCS EAM message delivery and acknowledgement.

(c) Request publication of GENSER PLA and Routing Indicator for USSOUTHCOM deployed if USSOUTHCOM relocates to the alternate headquarters.

(d) Request Contingency Alternative Routing Procedures (CARP) to Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ or MDEOC if USCINCSO relocates to the alternate headquarters.

(4) If not already in operations, coordinate activation of a toll free telephone number at headquarters building Miami, with pre-recorded message capability.

(5) Power supplies will be disconnected from computers and components prior to movement

(6) LAN connections to computer processors will not be removed. If removed, reattachment of LAN connections will require Help Desk assistance for every processor affected.

(7) Components will be protected by plastic sheeting obtained by USAG-M.

b. USSOUTHCOM ACP Communications Support.

(1) While en route to the alternate headquarters at Davis Monthan AFB, AZ, the CINC's aircraft will maintain UHF TACSAT connectivity with the ACP and the USSOUTHCOM Headquarters at Miami.

(2) Upon arrival at the alternate headquarters, in conjunction with 12AF CC (if ACP is located at Davis Monthan AFB, TX) establish and maintain the following communications connectivity: UHF TACSAT communications IAW Annex 1 to this Appendix; Defense Switch Network (DSN) access; Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN) access; Global Command and Control System (GCCS) access, SIPRNET access, NIPRNET access and VTC access, JWICS AUTODIN/DMS (GENSER and DSSCS) service and NMCC CJCSAN.

(3) See reference Appendix B of the basic plan.

c. Commander, SOUTHAF.

(1) When directed, activate a toll free telephone number with pre-recorded message capability. Provide the toll-free telephone number and name/telephone number of a SOUTHAF POC to the USSOUTHCOM SCJ6 CAT representative. The SOUTHAF POC will be provided with required messages and periodic updates to be recorded.

(2) Provide the following communications services: DSN access (10 lines); DRSN access (5 lines); Global Command and Control System (GCCS) access, SIPRNET access, NIPRNET access, CJCSAN, and AUTODIN/DMS service (GENSER and DSSCS).

(3) Be prepared to provide other communications support as required.

d. Commander, 93rd Signal Brigade (or assigned unit).

(1) Be prepared, upon request of USSOUTHCOM, to provide the following communications support during recovery operations:

(a) UHF TACSAT communications IAW Appendix 1 to this Appendix; Defense Switch Network (DSN) access; Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN) access; Global Command and Control System (GCCS) access, CNCMS, JWICS, VTC access, SIPRNET access, NIPRNET access, AUTODIN/DMS (GENSER and DSSCS) service or AMHS, and NMCC CJCSAN.

(b) Other communications support as required.

ANNEX:

1. Communications Radio Net Requirements (Classified Annex published separately by SCJ6).

APPENDIX E**RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION**

1. Procedures. As soon as conditions permit, the SCCS with assistance from USAG - M/DPO, ASA Commander, SCSG, possibly Miami -Dade and/or Federal Emergency Response and Law Enforcement, SCEN, SCJ2 Security Division, SCJ3 and SCJ6 will conduct an assessment of the headquarters building and all other USSOUTHCOM facilities in Miami. Once the evaluation has been made and the situation has been determined to be safe, restoration and recovery operations will begin. The priority of work will be:

(1) Restoration of C2 capability

(2) Salvage and protection of classified material/equipment and personnel accountability.

2. Command Restoration Efforts.

a. Within 6 hours after the Lead Federal Agency deems it prudent to return the Command to the affected building, the DPO and WMDCMG (DPR's from each directorate) should return to the headquarters for a complete headquarters damage assessment. This initial assessment will be assembled by the DPO, who coordinates reconstitution actions with the RC, the command's facility manager and civil authorities, if necessary.

(1) The facility manager will identify all mission essential utility services requiring priority restoration.

(2) The facility manager will contact the USAG -M Commander before activating generator power prior to commercial power being restored.

(3) SCJ6 will coordinate with Cdr, 93rd Signal Brigade (or other assigned unit) for communication requirements.

b. Within 6 hours after the Lead Federal Agency deems it prudent to return the Command to the affected building, personnel will report to their directorates/DPRs to assist in clean-up actions to restore the headquarters to full operations.

3. The JOIC will make periodic SITREPS to the CINC and NMCC concerning restoration efforts.

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APPENDIX F

DEFINITIONS

ALL CLEAR: Danger from WMD event is over. All clear is generally accepted to mean that NBC conditions have abated.

Alternate Command Post (ACP): A pre-designated location used to support C2 functions should the USSOUTHCOM HQ building in Miami be damaged, or potentially damaged, to the extent that C2 functions can not be effected on the premises. The ACP for WMD event evacuation plan is located at Davis-Monthan AFB or the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center (MDEOC).

Alternate Command Post (ACP). Any location pre-designated by a commander to support command and control functions should the commander decide to move his command center operations. It may be partially or fully equipped and manned, or it may be the command post of a subordinate unit. USCINCSO's designated ACP is HQ 12 AF at Davis Monthan, Arizona or the MDEOC. It is a fully equipped and manned ACP consisting of the following elements: USSOUTHCOM Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC) to include the sub-elements of Force Tracking, CINC communications, Indications and Warning, and Cryptologic Support; USSOUTHCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) to include the sub-elements of collection management, customer support, imagery, analysis and targeting; Special Technical Operations (STO); a Crisis Action Team to include the sub-elements of current operations (air, ground, maritime), component liaison, personnel, logistics, intelligence operations and planning, operational planning, political/military operations, communications, public affairs, programs and resources, and legal; and augmentation staff as required.

Alternate JOIC. A subordinate unit who assumes the C2 responsibilities and functions of USSOUTHCOM JOIC during emergencies.

ACP Advance Team. Comprised of designated members of USSOUTHCOM staff who deploy to the ACP prior to the arrival of the ACP Main Body. The ACP Advance Team's primary responsibility is to prepare the ACP for activation.

ACP Main Body. Comprised of designated members of the JOIC watch who deploy to the ACP in the event a major WMD event threatens the Miami HQ. The ACP Main Body's primary responsibility is to take over command and control functions from the JOIC in Miami if conditions warrant.

Command Group Alpha. Comprised of USCINCSO and designated USSOUTHCOM command personnel who deploy to the ACP when necessary to ensure continuity of command and control. Command Group Alpha composition is provided in Appendix B.

Continuity of Operations. The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission, in carrying

out the national military and theater engagement strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the Commander in Chief (CINC), as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff, and others acting under the authority and direction of the CINC.

JOIC. Serves as USCINCSO's command and control link to the National Command Authority, Components, and Subordinate Commands. In addition, the JOIC provides indications and warning intelligence to USSOUTHCOM, the National Command Authority, and Subordinate Commands.

EMERGCON DEFENSE EMEGENCY: Emergency Condition declared in the event of a defense emergency.

WMD event: An attack on USSOUTHCOM, its subordinate components, or its outlying facilities in Miami using a Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical device or material.

APPENDIX G

ABBREVIATIONS

AFB	Air Force Base	AIS Automated Information Systems
ACP	Alternate Command Post	
AOI	Area of Interest	
AOR	Area of Responsibility	
ARB	Air Reserve Base	
ASA	Army Signal Activity	
Bde	Brigade	
C2	Command and Control	
CAC	Crisis Action Center	
CARP	Contingency Alternative Routing Procedures	
CAT	Crisis Action Team	
CJCSAN	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network	
COMSEC	Communications Security	
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan	
CM	Consequence Management	
CMG	Consequence Management Group	
CP	Command Post	
CRC	Crisis Response Cell	
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration	
DPO	Disaster Preparedness Officer	
DPR	Disaster Preparedness Representative	
DRSN	Defense Red Switch Network	
DSN	Defense Switch Network	
DSSCS	Defense Special Security Communications System	
EAM	Emergency Action Message	
EMERGCON	Emergency Condition	
GCCS	Global Command and Control System	
GENSER	General Service	
HQ	Headquarters	
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff	
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force	
JOIC	Joint Operations and Intelligence Center	
JMC	Joint Movement Center	
JTF	Joint Task Force	
LNO	Liaison Officer	
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center	
METOC	Meteorological and Oceanographic	
MRC	Miami Reception Center	
MRE	Meals Ready to Eat	
NARCS	Non-Automated Relay Center Support	
NMCC	National Military Command Center	
OEM	Office of Emergency Management	

OPR	Operations Planning Requirements
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PLAD	Plain Language Address Directory
RC	Disaster Preparedness Response Cell
SAP	Special Access Program
SCCC	Southern Command Commander in Chief (Office Symbol)
SCCH	Southern Command Chaplain (Office Symbol)
SCCS	Southern Command Chief of Staff (Office Symbol)
SCCS-P	Southern Command Chief of Staff – Protocol (Office Symbol)
SCDC	Southern Command Deputy Commander in Chief (Office Symbol)
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SCSG	Southern Command Surgeon General (Office Symbol)
SCSJS	Secretary of the Joint Staff (office symbol)
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPECAT	Special Category
SSO	Special Security Officer
STEMS	SOUTHCOM Theater Enterprise Management System
TACSAT	Tactical Satellite
UPS	Uninterrupted Power Supply
USAG-M	U.S. ARMY GARRISON - MIAMI
USCG	United States Coast Guard
WMD	Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction
WMDWG	Weapons of Mass Destruction Working Group
WMDCMG	Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management Group

APPENDIX H

SYMPTOM MATRIX FOR A SUSPECTED WMD EVENT

AGENT	SYMPTOMS	INDICATORS	ENTRY WAYS
RADIOACTIVE (Symptoms types and time of effect depend on dosage, length of exposure, and type of material)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Burned Red Skin 2. Nausea 3. Diarrhea 4. Vomiting 5. Hair Loss 6. Convulsions 7. Unconsciousness 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Several people with similar symptoms 2. Abandoned packages or containers 3. Explosion 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Breathe in 2. Swallowing 3. Skin Contact 4. Radiation Waves
BIOLOGICAL (Symptoms appear often in days)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Coughing (dry cough for Anthrax) 2. Flu-like symptoms 3. Sweating 4. Shortness of Breath 5. Weakness of fatigue 6. Vomiting 7. Diarrhea 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Unusual, unexpected powder substance 2. Unusual number of people with the Flu 3. Unusual spraying 4. Abandoned spraying devices 5. Unseasonable illness (e.g. Flu in the summer) 6. Several people with food poisoning symptoms (vomiting, diarrhea) 7. Terrorist Calls and reports an attack 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Breathe in 2. Breaks in skin 3. Injection 4. Eat or drink
CHEMICAL (symptoms within seconds or minutes)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Red or irritated eyes and skin 2. Choking or coughing 3. Tightness of chest or shortness of breath 4. Vomiting/Nausea 5. Runny nose 6. Dizziness or loss of consciousness 7. Convulsions or seizures 8. Pinpointed pupils and dimness of vision 9. May appear to be a heart attack 10. Burning Sensation on skin 11. Eye Pain 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Groups of people displaying unusual behavior 2. Abandoned spraying devices or packages 3. Unusual fogs, clouds, or mists 4. Pools of liquid with no known source or an unusual source (e.g. backpack or paper bag with liquid oozing out) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Breathe in 2. Direct contact with skin and/or eyes 3. Eat or drink

APPENDIX I

USSOUTHCOM PUBLIC AFFAIRS CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

This operating instruction establishes the method for US Southern Command Public Affairs (SCPA) responses to and coverage of accidents, incidents, and other emergencies effecting USSOUTHCOM assets located in Miami, Florida.

1. References: DoD directives 5400.13, 5200.1, 5230.9, 5500.7, and C-5200.5. DoD instructions 5230.29, 5400.10, 2000.14 USAG-M Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Plan (16 Nov 00)

2. Background. During a crisis situation, SCPA will have three strategic overriding concerns.

- a. Protect the command's reputation for integrity and responsibility.
- b. Provide efficient communications to serve the public interest and the workforce.
- c. Return the command to a non-crisis state as quickly as possible.

3. Purpose. SCPA formulates communications policy and objectives relating to a particular emergency. Regardless of the specific nature of the emergency, the following objectives will apply:

- a. Identify the proper audiences to be notified (workforce, families, public at-large).
- b. Ensure audiences are provided all the information to protect health and safety.
- c. Release accurate and complete information as soon as it becomes available and can be released without detrimental effect on efforts to alleviate the crisis.
- d. Counteract the effects of rumor and inaccurate information.
- e. Provide a sole voice for the command.

4. Procedures:

- a. One SCPA representative will be on standby at all times. If at anytime, the SCPA on-call representative cannot be contacted directly, The Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC) will be responsible for contacting the SCPA chain of command, starting with the director.
- b. General:
 1. Upon notification of an alert, serious accident/incident, or other emergency, the SCPA representative who first learns of the event will immediately notify the PA Director, or subordinates if the director is not available, and initiate a recall if necessary
 2. In most instances, SCPA personnel will operate from three areas:
 - (a) SCPA office, HQUSSOUTHCOM Room 1240.
 - (b) Crisis Action Center (CAC)
 - (c) Scene of the accident or incident.
 3. All SCPA personnel will normally report directly to the office. In most cases, personnel in the Media Relations branch will operate The Media Operations Center in the SCPA office or other designated location. The SCPA director or his designee will contact and task Plans and Operations personnel as necessary. Assignment variations will be made by the Director or Deputy Director as necessary.
 4. Generally, all releases to news media will be made by the SCPA Media Relations Branch after proper approval by the SCPA Director and/or higher headquarters. Under no circumstances will SCPA personnel accept any information, pertaining to an emergency,

as factual or releasable from any agency outside of the CAC.

5. SCPA personnel will double-check all actions by referring to OASD(PA) instructions pertaining to emergency situations.
6. If required to release information without SCPA director guidance, SCPA personnel will ensure that only a limited amount of information – enough to satisfy a reasonable initial release of information to media. Always caveat these releases with the statement “more information will be release as soon as it becomes available.” Remember that a major consideration in the release of information is to avoid unduly alarming of the public.
7. Before releasing the names of ANY DoD casualties or seriously injured personnel, SCPA personnel make sure the next of kin have been notified. Coordinate with J1 and USAG-Miami representatives. Under no circumstances will such names be released until authorized by the SCPA director, or designated representative.

c. SCPA Personnel Responsibilities:

1. At SCPA Office:

- (a) Maintain a log of all actions and phone calls. Logs will be in chronological order using local time. A log should be started for media queries regarding the current situation.
- (b) If necessary, order transportation to transport news media to the scene or other advantageous point. Make sure permission has been obtained from the CAC director prior to allowing media to go to the scene.
- (c) Monitor local and national television outlets. Record televised news stories via VCRs located in SCPA office.
- (d) Compile all local print and televised stories regarding the incident. Forward them to OASD(PA) as appropriate.
- (e) If appropriate, coordinate with the following government agencies: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Environmental Protection Agency, Miami-Dade Fire-Rescue, Miami-Dade Police, local hospitals and Red Cross.

2. At the CAC:

- (a) Maintain a log of all actions on the CAC website.
- (b) Establish contact and notify OASD(PA) of the situation, 703-697-5131. At night, the JOIC (ext. 4900) can patch a call to the OASD(PA) alert duty representative.
- (c) Clear all press releases through the CAC Director prior to sending it to the SCPA office. Update information frequently. SCPA's only source of releasable information is the CAC PA representative.

3. At the scene:

- (a) Report to the on-scene commander.
- (b) Maintain a log of actions taken

- (c) Get all the facts possible, but pass only those to the CAC representative which are not already provided by other on-scene people. **DO NOT PASS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION VIA UNSECURE MEANS.**
 - (d) If the location has a commercial telephone, use it. Make an initial call to the SCPA office to give location/phone number and information.
 - (e) Receive and brief all news media at the scene. Remember priorities—rescue and recovery operations should not be interfered by PA business. If there is danger, ensure that the media remain outside the cordon area and brief them why this is necessary.
 - (f) Remain at the scene until relieved or released.
4. Off-base accidents/incidents:
- (a) The SCPA Director or a designated representative will report to the scene to aid the on-scene commander.
 - (b) Inform SCPA office of all actions. Coordinate releases, especially those regarding casualties.
 - (c) Establish a cooperative working relationship with civilian officials and media representatives at the scene.
5. Escorting news media:
- (a) At USSOUTHCOM HQ: All news media will be escorted at all times by an SCPA representative. Request assistance from the DoD Police as necessary.
 - (b) Get the facts for the media. Remember that SCPA is their sole official point of contact for command information. However, politely ask the media **NOT TO INTERFERE WITH RESCUE, FIREFIGHTING OR SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ANY WAY.** Ask for DoD Police or civil law enforcement assistance if necessary but **DO NOT ATTEMPT TO RESTRAIN THE MEDIA.**
 - (c) Prepare an after action report for OASD(PA). Collect and keep all logs and reports.

APPENDIX J

**SCSG WMD EVENT SOP
COMMAND RESPONSE TO A WMD EVENT
(Medical SOP/Procedures)**

1. **Introduction.** In a WMD event it is important to not only act appropriately but to record appropriate information in order to provide the best possible care while not contaminating the area.
2. **Initial Report.** Upon notification, the Command Surgeon's Office will ensure both the SOUTHCOM Clinic and JOIC are aware of event. The primary emergency medical response in a WMD event will be local agencies.
3. **Medical Management.** Medical management of a WMD event is time dependent. Casualty management capabilities at the SOUTHCOM Clinic are limited. The clinic's primary mission will be to triage, stabilize and decontaminate. Triage, stabilization, treatment will be conducted IAW SOUTHCOM Clinic SOPs. It is important to notify appropriate response organization, initiate immediate care, and track patient disposition.
 - a. Decontaminate patient if contaminated.
 - b. Once decontaminated, triage and treat patient IAW HQ SOUTHCOM Clinic Mass Casualty SOP.
 - c. It may be necessary to administer prophylactic treatment for exposure to NBC agents. Such decisions will be made by the Command Surgeon in collaboration with attending physician and situation specifics, i.e., environmental samples with positive WMD results, symptoms of WMD compared to any exhibited by patients, etc. Sample Collection. The proper collection, disposition, analyses and results of non-medical samples to determine WMD existence is critical to medical management. All samples will be collected IAW Miami-Dade Fire Department HAZMAT Team Procedures. Biological samples are transported to the Miami-Dade County Health Department laboratory located at 1325 NW 14th Ave, Miami, FL^{2,3}. The Command Surgeon is designated as the Liaison Officer for results submitted to the Miami-Dade County Health Department laboratory.
 - d. The Command Surgeon will decide on requirements to notify the Commands at Dwight D. Eisenhower Army Medical Center (DDEAMC), U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM), JCS (J4MRD) and other pertinent DoD medical Agencies.
4. **Results Notifications:** The attending physician will make specific patient notifications. The Command Surgeon will receive results for Suspect Biological Warfare Agent analyses from the Miami-Dade County Health Department. Those results will get relayed through command channels to the interested parties to include JOIC, SOUTHCOM Health Clinic and area occupants.

QUESTIONS UPON WMD EVENT

1. Initial Report Received:

- a. From: _____
- b. Date and time of Report: _____
- c. Location: _____
- d. Site Security: _____
- e. Evidence of NBC Contamination: _____
- f. NBC Area Contamination: [] Bio [] Chem [] Rad
- g. NBC Patient Contamination: [] Bio [] Chem [] Rad
- h. Suspect contamination because: _____
- i. Miami-Dade HAZMAT 17 Requested¹: [] Yes [] No

2. Patients:

- a. Number of Patients: (Litter:____, Ambulatory:____).
- b. Patients' contaminated: _____
- c. Patients' decontaminated: _____
- d. Patients' disposition:
 - (1) Local Hospital: _____
 - (2) SOUTHCOM Clinic: _____
- e. Transport via: _____

3. Samples Collection/Disposition:

- a. Type of Sample: _____
- b. Collected by: _____
- c. Date and Time of Collection: _____
- d. Identification Numbers: _____
- e. Transported where for analyses^{2,3}: _____
- f. Liaison made with Miami-Dade County Health department [] Yes [] No
- g. Who and when contacted: _____

4. Sample Results:

Identification Number	Results	Identification Number	Results
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

5. Notifications: _____
- _____
- _____

APPENDIX K**ESSENTIAL INFORMATION FOR A WMD INCIDENT**

1. Time of call
2. Time of suspected WMD agent release
3. Time agent was discovered
4. incident location
5. Specific indications of an NBC incident
6. Victims?
7. Signs of distress?
8. Number of Victims
9. Describe Symptoms
10. How delivered? (e.g. package, abandoned container, explosive device, vehicle, sprayer, etc.)
11. If vehicle was used, description (i.e. type, color, unique characteristics, etc.)
12. Any markings on delivery device?
13. Fire or explosion?
14. Spillage or pools of liquid?
15. Smoke or vapor cloud?
16. Bursting or hissing sound?
17. Unusual odor?
18. Weather conditions?
19. Knowledgeable witness(es)?
20. If package/letter:
 - a. Description of the package/letter
 - b. Why is it suspicious?
 - c. If suspicious powder/substance released, describe substance.
 - d. Who is suspicious item for?
 - e. Where is it from?
 - f. Contact made with mailing agent?
 - g. Other packages in similar condition?
 - h. SG Involved yet?

APPENDIX L

SHELTERING IN PLACE

The protection provided by sheltering in place is governed by the following variables:

- ? Air exchange rate of building. The lower the air exchange rate, the greater the protection afforded. The air exchange rate of any building increases as wind speed increases and the inside-outside temperature differential increases.
- ? Duration of exposure. The protection provided by passive shelter varies with time, diminishing as the time of exposure increases. Sheltering in place is most effective against hazards of short duration. If the effect of filtering by the building is neglected, the protection factor approaches 1 (no protection) as the duration of exposure becomes very long.
- ? Period of occupancy. How long occupants remain in the building after the hazardous cloud has passed also affects the level of protection. Because the building slowly releases contaminants that have infiltrated, at some point during cloud passage the concentration inside exceeds the concentration outside. Maximum protection is obtained by increasing the air exchange rate after cloud passage by turning on fresh air fans or opening windows and doors, or by exiting the building into clean air.
- ? Passive filtering. Passive filtering occurs when the chemical vapor/gas is removed from the air by sorption as it passes through cracks and pores and comes in contact with materials inside the building. The tighter the building, the greater is the contribution of passive filtering to the protection factor. Tests with the agents sarin and mustard show that a substantial portion of agent can be removed by this process, particularly with agents of lower vapor pressure. The filtering effect of a tight wooden building was shown to be substantial for sarin and mustard agents in experiments by the Army. A sample set of instructions for sheltering in place is as follows:
 - ? Preparations for Sheltering:
 - ✍ For the greatest possible protection, select a “safe room” in advance and store a kit of expedient sheltering materials in or near this room for use in an emergency.
 - ✍ A kit of sheltering supplies should contain: a roll of two-inch wide cloth tape (duct tape), plastic sheeting such as polyethylene drop cloth adequate to cover each window of a safe room, a radio, a container of water, and a small amount of non-perishable food, to be purchased and maintained by each directorate DPR.
 - ✍ If you are not already indoors, go indoors and close all windows and doors.
 - ✍ Turn off ALL air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems.
 - ✍ Go into your selected safe room.
 - ✍ Once inside, close the door and seal the room as follows:
 - ✍ Place two inch wide tape cloth (duct tape) around the door to seal the space between the door and its frame.

- ✍ Place a plastic sheet (such as a polyethylene drop cloth) over the window. Starting at the top, place continuous overlapping strips of tape at the edges of all four sides to seal the window.
- ✍ Place duct tape over any vents, such as the ventilation fan opening, gaps around pipes that come through the wall, or electrical outlets.
- ✍ Turn on a radio or television and listen for emergency instructions.
- ✍ Wait calmly for emergency instructions via the command loudspeaker system and leave the telephone lines open if emergency information is to be transmitted by telephone.

You will receive instructions about when it is safe to vacate the building via the command loudspeaker system. Once you are told it is safe to come out of your shelter, do not delay.